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A B S TRACT. Severability clauses can help administrative agencies minimize the damage
caused by judicial review and can make the regulatory environment more efficient, participatory,
and predictable. Yet agencies rarely include these clauses in their rules because courts tend to
treat administrative rules with severability clauses the same as those without. Courts have treated
administrative severability clauses in this way largely because they have mistakenly analogized
them to severability clauses contained in statutes. While Congress routinely includes severability
clauses in statutes that are drafted in distinct iterations, by different committees with legislative
staff who often lack the time and expertise to consider the clauses' potential ramifications, ad-
ministrative agencies use these clauses with more care. This Article proposes a Chevron-style
deference framework for administrative severability clauses. Under this framework, after a
reviewing court has set aside a challenged regulatory provision, the court should defer to a
promulgating agency's opinion on severability as expressed through a severability clause, unless
the remainder of the rule itself would suffer from legal defects resulting from the court's invali-
dation of the challenged provisions. This framework would better promote the overarching goals
of administrative law than do current judicial doctrine and agency practice.
A U T H 0 R S. Charles W. Tyler is a law clerk to the Honorable Goodwin Liu, Associate Justice,
Supreme Court of California; Yale Law School, J.D. 2013. E. Donald Elliott is Adjunct Professor
of Law, Yale Law School, and Senior of Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP. For their sugges-
tions and encouragement, we thank Ali Deich, Arthur Ewenczyk, Heather Gerken, Abbe Gluck,
Daniel Hemel, Chris Hu, Rob Katz, Daniel Markovits, Jerry Mashaw, Tracey Meares, Ben Mos-
kowitz, Janice Ong, Nick Parrillo, Judith Resnik, Stan Richards, Rebecca Schonberg, Travis Sil-
va, Andrew Tutt, and Ke Wu. The views set forth in this Article are the personal views of the
authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions with which they are af-




1. SEVERABILITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2294
A. The Severability Decision 2294
i. The Severability of Statutes 2294
2. The Severability of Administrative Rules 2296
B. The Who-Decides Question 2297
1. Agency Intent 2298
2. Workability of the Remainder 2299
a. Expertise 2299
b. Accountability 2301
c. Rule of Law 23o6
d. Efficiency 2309
II. THE STRANGE DEARTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEVERABILITY CLAUSES 2312
A. De Novo Review by the Courts 2312
B. Neglect in the Agencies 2318
III. DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE SEVERABILITY CLAUSES 2324
A. Disassociating Statutory and Administrative Severability Clauses 2324
1. Attention Paid to Severability Clauses 2326
2. Time Pressure 2327
3. Centralization 2329
B. A Chevron-Style Framework for Severability Clauses 2331
i. Step One: Address Legal Defects 2334
a. Identifying Defects 2335
b. Remedying Defects 2338
2. Step Two: Defer to the Agency 2341
3. Step Zero: The Limits of the Deference Framework 2344
CONCLUSION 2348
APPENDIX: ADMINISTRATIVE SEVERABILITY CLAUSES BY AGENCY 2349
2287
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
'Judicial review controls administrative action in the same way that tornadoes
control the rice crop in Arkansas: they appear unpredictably, wreak havoc,
and then depart."
- Jerry Mashaw'
This Article explores a topic overlooked in legal scholarship: severability
clauses in administrative regulations. "Administrative severability clauses," as
we call them, are provisions of administrative rules that clarify whether an
agency intends for a rule to remain in effect if a court were to invalidate a por-
tion of the rule.2 A recent example, to which we return at several points in the
Article, helps to illustrate the function and potential importance of these claus-
es.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently published a pro-
posed rule, commonly referred to as the "Clean Power Plan."3 Political analysts
have dubbed it the "centerpiece" of the Obama Administration's strategy on
climate change.4 The Clean Power Plan aspires to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions by thirty percent below 2005 levels before 2030 by requiring states to
1. This is a paraphrase of a remark often ascribed to Jerry Mashaw. The remark always con-
nects natural disasters with vegetation. Sometimes it is about tornadoes controlling rice
crops, sometimes forest fires controlling the underbrush, but the point is always the same:
judicial review is "both stochastic and destructive." Email from Jerry Mashaw, Sterling Pro-
fessor of Law, Yale Law Sch., to Charles Tyler, J.D. 2013, Yale Law Sch. (Dec. 24, 2014,
08:08 EST) (on file with author); see also JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10-14 (1990); Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of
Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 185, 200-04 (1994).
a. When we refer to administrative "rules" in this Article, we mean legislative rules, usually
adopted through notice and comment. Although a severability clause is usually contained in
the regulatory text, some agencies indicate that a rule is severable in the rule's statement of
basis and purpose. See, e.g., Applications for FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Patent
Submission and Listing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,695-96 (June 18, 2003) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. Pt. 314). Where possible, we have counted these remarks as severa-
bility clauses because they have many of the same benefits as severability clauses included in
a rule's text.
3. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,832 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines].







meet certain carbon pollution emissions goals.' To set those goals, the EPA has
identified four measures, which the proposed rule terms "building blocks" and
which the agency has determined together make up the "best system of emis-
sion reduction." 6 The building blocks are: (i) making existing coal plants more
efficient; (2) using existing gas plants more effectively; (3) increasing reliance
on renewable and nuclear energy sources; and (4) improving end-use energy
efficiency. 7 Like many environmental regulations, the Clean Power Plan is an
example of cooperative federalism. While states are free to formulate their own
plans for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, they must implement plans that
will at least match the emissions reductions that the EPA has determined could
be achieved by implementing the four building blocks.
Since the EPA's emissions goals are derived from the building blocks, regu-
lated entities opposed to the Clean Power Plan-and there are many-are likely
to challenge the building blocks in court. The agency may therefore be con-
cerned that a court will vacate the entire Clean Power Plan if a court finds that
just one of the building blocks is invalid. Likely in order to manage this risk,
the EPA inserted a severability clause into the proposed rule's text. The clause
provides that if a court invalidates one or more of the building blocks, the re-
mainder of the rule should stay in effect, and the states' adjusted emissions tar-
gets should be based on the remainder of the building blocks.'
The Clean Power Plan's severability clause will become relevant in litiga-
tion if a discontent stakeholder challenges the rule and the reviewing court sets
one or more of the building blocks aside. The court will then have to make
what we call the "severability decision"; it will have to choose between invali-
dating only the challenged provision, invalidating the challenged provision and
several other provisions, or invalidating the entire rule.
In the absence of the severability clause, the severability decision requires a
reviewing court to apply a fairly well-established doctrinal framework. But
5. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, supra note 3, at 34,832.
6. Id. at 34,836.
7. Id.
8. The severability clause reads:
We consider our proposed findings of the BSER [Best System of Emission Re-
duction] with respect to the various building blocks to be severable, such that in
the event a court were to invalidate our finding with respect to any particular
building block, we would find that the BSER consists of the remaining building
blocks. The state goals that would result from any combination of the building
blocks can be computed from data included in the Goal Computation TSD
[Technical Support Document] and its appendices using the methodology de-
scribed in the preamble and that TSD.
Id. at 34,892.
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when a rule contains a severability clause, such as the one contained in the
Clean Power Plan, it raises an important question that courts and commenta-
tors have largely overlooked. Who should decide whether an invalidated provi-
sion of a rule is severable? We call this the "who-decides question." The who-
decides question implicates the level of deference that a reviewing court should
give to a promulgating agency's opinion on the severability of a rule expressed
in a severability clause.
Once raised, the who-decides question involves some of the most basic is-
sues in administrative law -issues about the allocation of decision-making au-
thority in the federal government. When an agency has expressed its view on
severability, should a court defer to the agency, as it would when an agency
reasonably interprets an ambiguous statute pursuant to a congressional delega-
tion of lawmaking authority?9 If a rule is within an agency's bailiwick because
it was promulgated pursuant to a statutory delegation of authority, does the
severability of the rule also fall within its bailiwick, or is the severability deci-
sion intrinsically within the judicial power? Does a severability clause consti-
tute an interpretation of the agency's own rule, qualifying it for Seminole Rock
deference (that is, deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations) ?1o If courts should give some measure of deference to an agency's
opinion on severability, how much? Do some of the agency's statements on
severability, but not others, deserve deference?
The visibility of the Clean Power Plan's severability clause notwithstand-
ing, these questions remain mostly under-theorized. Until the last two decades,
only three articles had been devoted to severability doctrine in either statutes or
rules." And courts have analyzed the doctrine in little more depth. Former
Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit John Clifford Wallace once lamented that
"[t]he test for severability has been stated often but rarely explained."' 2 To be
sure, theoretical analysis of the severability of statutes has become more robust
in recent years. The severability doctrine has figured prominently in recent de-
9. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); see also
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2oo1).
lo. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that the agency's interpretation is controlling unless it is
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation") (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REv. 41 (1995); John
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993); Robert L. Stern, Separability and
Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REv. 76 (1937).




bates in both Congress'3 and the Supreme Court, 4 and scholars have respond-
ed with full articles on the subject."5 But the analysis of administrative severabil-
ity doctrine continues to lag behind. There have been no law review articles
addressing severability in administrative law, and we have found only one sec-
ondary source even mentioning the difference between the severability analyses
in the statutory and administrative contexts.'
6
The dearth of scholarship is probably due, in part, to the answer that the
agencies and the courts currently give to the who-decides question. Agencies
tend to include severability clauses in their rules infrequently and sporadically.
Even when an agency does include a severability clause in a rule, the current
doctrine suggests that a reviewing court should not defer to it. Thus, the cur-
rent judicial doctrine and agency practice regarding administrative severability
represents one possible allocation of decision-making authority: namely, courts
make the severability decision de novo without regard to the existence of a sev-
erability clause. As a result, these relatively insignificant clauses have not re-
ceived much attention from commentators.
This Article maintains that current judicial doctrine and agency practice re-
garding severability are misguided. We think that courts should defer to ad-
ministrative severability clauses and that agencies should more frequently in-
clude them in their rules. We propose a deference framework for
13. In a widely covered dispute, Congress debated the inclusion of either a severability clause or
a nonseverability clause in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. See Excerpts From
Senate Debate on Donations: Skirmishing and Predictions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 20ol, http://
www.nytimes.conm/2o oi/o3/3o/us/excerpts-from-senate-debate-on-donations-skirmishing
-and-predictions.html [http://perma.cc/AA47-RVQC].
14. The Court has addressed the severability doctrine in several recent cases, including: Execu-
tive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014); National Federation of In-
dependent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Ac-
counting Oversight Board, S61 U.S. 477 (2010); and Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern
New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
iS. See Tom Campbell, Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495 (2011); Michael C. Dorf,
Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 303 (2007); Tobias A. Dorsey, Remarks, Sense and Severa-
bility, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 877 (2012); Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses Constitutional?,
68 ALB. L. REV. 997 (2005); Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: How Much of a
Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 1 (2011); Michael D. Shum-
sky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227 (2004); Kevin
C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 8S N.Y.U. L. REv. 738 (2010); Rachel J. Ezzell, Note,
Statutory Interdependence in Severability Analysis, III MICH. L. REv. 1481 (2013); C. Vered
Jona, Note, Cleaning Up for Congress: Why Courts Should Reject the Presumption of Severability
in the Face of Intentionally Unconstitutional Legislation, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 698 (2008);
Jenna L. Kamiat, Comment, PPACA and the Individual Mandate: A Healthy Approach to Sev-
erability, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 2237 (2012).
16. See Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Adminis-
trative Law, 53 DuKE L.J. 291, 330 (2003).
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administrative severability clauses, similar to the Chevron and Seminole Rock
frameworks, under which both courts and agencies would play a role in the
severability decision.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explains the severability decision
and the who-decides question in more detail. In Part I.A, we discuss the cur-
rent severability doctrine. As we explain, the doctrinal test for severability con-
sists of two questions: (1) whether the promulgating agency would have in-
tended for the remainder of a regulation to stay in effect; and (2) whether the
remainder of the regulation is workable.
In Part I.B, we consider which institution-the reviewing court or the
promulgating agency-is best suited to answer each of these questions. We
conclude that when a promulgating agency has expressed an opinion on sever-
ability through a severability clause, it has offered an answer to the intent and
workability questions. Because the promulgating agency is better equipped
than a court to assess both its own intent on severability and the workability of
a regulatory remainder, the agency's answers to those questions deserve defer-
ence. This preliminary discussion will serve as helpful background for our the-
sis that the current doctrine and practice on severability clauses misallocates
decision-making authority and for our proposal of a deference framework for
administrative severability clauses.
Part II describes the current judicial doctrine and agency practice on ad-
ministrative severability clauses and shows that the doctrine and practice do
not follow the allocation of decision-making authority suggested in Part I. In
Part II.A, we explain that federal courts for decades have declined to take sever-
ability clauses in statutes at face value. We then explain that the doctrinal
treatment of statutory severability clauses has been applied to administrative
severability clauses because courts have reflexively analogized the two.
In Part II.B, we explain that agencies do not generally include severability
clauses in their rules. Instead, agencies usually offer their opinions on severa-
bility only when required to do so in litigation. Our research suggests that
agencies behave in this way because promulgating severability clauses through
notice-and-comment procedures often entails significant ex ante and ex post
costs that courts do not reward through greater deference. In light of the dis-
cussion in Part I, we conclude that judicial doctrine and agency practice regard-
ing severability are misguided. Courts should develop a framework for defer-
ring to administrative severability clauses that would create greater incentives
for agencies to include severability clauses in their rules.
Part III outlines our proposed deference framework for administrative sev-
erability clauses. In Part III.A, we debunk the primary doctrinal obstacle to
such a framework. We argue that it is a mistake to evaluate administrative sev-
erability clauses through the same prism used to evaluate statutory severability
clauses. Congress and the agencies have different institutional capacities and
124:228 6 2015
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incentives. In Congress, severability clauses are often thrown in to far-reaching
statutes that are drafted in several iterations, by several committees with legis-
lative staff members who often lack the time and expertise to consider the
clauses' potential ramifications adequately. By contrast, administrative agencies
are more unified organizations that operate in a narrower regulatory space and
have staff with greater expertise; agencies can therefore devote more resources
to considering the potential consequences of a severability clause. As a result,
administrative severability clauses are a more useful guide to the severability
decision than statutory severability clauses. The analogy between statutory and
administrative severability clauses is thus misplaced.
In Part III.B, we articulate a framework that courts can use to evaluate
whether to sever an invalid provision from a rule containing a severability
clause. When a court invalidates a provision of an administrative rule contain-
ing a severability clause, the court should first determine whether the remain-
der of the rule contains residual legal defects. For example, the court should de-
termine whether the remainder of the rule is unconstitutional, ultra vires,
arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise unlawful. If possible, the court should
remove those residual legal defects by setting aside additional provisions of the
rule. The court, however, should defer to the agency's severability decision if it
determines that the remainder does not contain inextricable, residual legal de-
fects. We also argue that courts should give Chevron-style deference only to
administrative severability clauses, rather than informal agency opinions on
severability. We acknowledge that agencies should be provided with some in-
centive to opine on severability before litigation commences because informal
agency opinions on severability will often be better than no opinion at all. To
encourage agencies to clarify their positions on severability, even if not through
notice-and-comment procedures, we propose that courts give Skidmore defer-
ence to informal agency actions, such as litigation briefs, that opine on severa-
bility. 7
The use of severability clauses in regulations is a fairly nascent experiment
in administrative law. While the case law on these devices is problematic, it is
not so entrenched that it could not easily be changed by a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) or the U.S.
Supreme Court. This Article shows that deference to severability clauses in
rules would have significant benefits for complex and ambitious regulatory
schemes like the EPA's Clean Power Plan. Since the EPA is scheduled to prom-
ulgate the final rule implementing the Plan in the summer of 2015, now is an
auspicious time for the courts to reconsider their approach to administrative
severability clauses.
17. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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I. SEVERABILITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Severability Decision
Questions of severability arise after a discontented stakeholder challenges a
provision of a statute or regulation and the reviewing court invalidates the
challenged provision as unconstitutional, ultra vires, arbitrary and capricious,
supported by insubstantial evidence, or otherwise unlawful. Having invalidat-
ed the challenged provision, the reviewing court's scrutiny turns to what we
call the statutory or regulatory "remainder" -the part of the statute or rule that
would remain absent the invalid provision. Assessing the remainder gives rise
to the severability decision- the remedial choice between invalidating the chal-
lenged provision alone, the challenged provision and some of the remainder, or
the entire statute or rule.
Courts and commentators have spent a good amount of time and energy
theorizing the severability decision. The Supreme Court has developed a fairly
useful test for making that decision. That test was first developed as the Court
considered the severability of congressional statutes. But, as we shall see, the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have repurposed the test for use in deter-
mining the severability of administrative regulations.
1. The Severability of Statutes
The leading case laying out the Court's modern severability doctrine is
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock. 8 In that case, several airlines challenged the em-
ployee protection program provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act. 9 Fol-
lowing the Court's landmark decision in Chadha,2° which held legislative veto
provisions unconstitutional, the Court held that the Deregulation Act's legisla-
tive veto provision was unconstitutional and that the challenged provision was
severable from the statutory remainder.2 Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun explained: "Unless [1] it is evident that the Legislature would not
have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of
18. 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). Alaska Airlines synthesized tests developed in earlier cases. See Re-
gan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931-32 (1983);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1o8 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968);
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
19. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 680.
2o. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. For criticism of the Chadha opinion, see E. Donald Elliott, INS v.
Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup.
CT. REv. 125.




that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if (2] what is left is fully op-
erative as a law."' Alaska Airlines holds that courts should ask two questions
when considering how to remedy invalid statutory provisions.23
First, would Congress have enacted the remainder without the unlawful
provision? Call this the "intent question." To answer this question, the review-
ing court investigates Congress's intent at the time it enacted the relevant stat-
ute. Ideally, the reviewing court would find evidence of Congress's actual in-
tent-that is, evidence that Congress considered the possibility that the
challenged provision would be struck down and intended the remainder of the
statute to stay in effect (or not) under those circumstances. Evidence of actual
intent, however, is often unavailable. In the absence of such evidence, courts
look for evidence of putative intent-that is, evidence of what Congress would
have wanted had it thought about the possibility that the challenged provision
would be struck down. So the intent question often requires a counterfactual
inquiry. It requires the reviewing court to recreate the bargain between stake-
holders that led to the statute's final text to determine what the lawmakers like-
ly would have wanted had they known that the reviewing court would strike
down the challenged provision."
The second question that courts are required to ask is whether the statutory
remainder is "fully operative as a law." In other words, is the remainder worka-
ble? Call this the "workability question." To answer this question, the court
must determine whether the statute is "capable of functioning independently"
of the challenged provision.25 Often courts answering this question will consid-
er the interdependence of the relevant statute's provisions. If the reviewing
court answers either question in the negative, it will strike down the entire
statute.
22. Id. at 684 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1o8 (1976) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
23. The Court's recent cases dealing with severability have followed the Alaska Airlines test. See,
e.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014); Free Enterprise Fund
v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010).
24. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 697 (stating that the legislative veto was not essential to
the legislative bargain over the Airline Deregulation Act); City of New Haven v. United
States, 809 F.2d 900, 907 (D.C. Cit. 1987); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, lo86 (Ct.
Cl. 1977).
2s. Alaska Airlines, 48o U.S. at 684 ("Congress could not have intended a constitutionally
flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the legisla-
tion is incapable of functioning independently.").
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2. The Severability ofAdministrative Rules
The Court's test for the severability of administrative regulations repurpos-
es the Alaska Airlines statutory severability test. The first Supreme Court case to
assess the severability of administrative regulations was K-Mart Corp. v. Car-
tier, where the Court considered whether a subsection of a Customs Service
regulation violated the Tariff Act of 1930.26 The Tariff Act prohibited the im-
portation of foreign merchandise bearing a trademark owned by a United
States' citizen (or a corporation organized within the United States) without
the owner's written consent. The Customs Service regulation permitted foreign
manufacturers to import trademarked goods into the United States if they had
received the U.S. trademark owner's authorization to use its trademark, but not
necessarily its authorization to import goods bearing the trademark into the
United States.27 The Court held that the regulation violated the Tariff Act.,
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the invalid subsection
of the Customs Service regulation was severable from the remainder because
invalidating the subsection would "not impair the function of the statute as a
whole" and because "there is no indication that the regulation would not have
been passed but for its inclusion."29 Although Justice Kennedy's analysis did
not cite any cases, he applied the same test for the severability of statutes that
the Court had articulated in Alaska Airlines just one year earlier.
Since the K-Mart decision, courts have applied the same test to determine
the severability of administrative provisions and the severability of statutory
provisions." For example, in Davis County Solid Waste Management v. EPA, the
26. 486 U.S. 281, 286-93 (discussing 46 Stat. 741 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 1526
(2012))).
27. Id. at 290
28. Id. at 291.
ag. Id. at 294.
For cases where the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. District Court in that Circuit have cited K-
Mart on the severability decision, see Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Virgin-
ia v. EPA, 116 F. 3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Davis Cnry. Solid Waste Mgmt. v. EPA (Davis
County II), io8 F.3d 1454, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, lO F.3d
812, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc granted, judgment vacated 15 F.3 d 186 (D.C. Cit.
1994); and Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jewell, 995 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2013). The D.C.
Circuit has decided several recent cases addressing the severability of administrative regula-
tions on the intent prong alone, without resorting to the workability prong. See, e.g., North
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2008); New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 584
(D.C. Cit. 2008); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 867 (D.C. Cit.
2006). The D.C. Circuit has given no indication, however, that severability no longer de-




(discussing 19 C.F.R. 5 133.21(C)(3) (1987)).
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D.C. Circuit reconsidered the issue of whether an invalid provision of an EPA
rule could be severed from the remainder of the rule.3 As in the case of stat-
utes, the court held that severability depends on: (i) whether there is any "'in-
dication that the regulation would not have been passed but for [the] inclu-
sion' of the [invalid] standards" and (2) whether severance would "'impair the
function of [the remainder of the rule]."" Here again, severability was made
to depend on the intent and workability questions.
B. The Who-Decides Question
The current severability doctrine may be useful for making the severability
decision when an agency has not included a severability clause in its rule. But
courts and commentators have generally not considered which institution
should make that decision when an agency has included a severability clause in
a rule. This is the who-decides question.
Perhaps the simple answer to the who-decides question is that the review-
ing court must decide. After all, the severability decision concerns a remedial
issue in litigation. Courts are the "tornadoes," in Mashaw's analogy, and they
must determine what is left in their wake.33 But this simplistic answer over-
looks the ways in which a severability clause could affect a reviewing court's
severability analysis.
When an agency includes a severability clause in a rule, it states whether it
would promulgate the rule without certain portions. More specifically, a sever-
ability clause can be seen as the agency's affirmative answer to the two compo-
nent questions of the severability test: the agency (1) intends for the remainder
to stay in effect; and (2) believes that the remainder is workable. In light of the
agency's opinion on severability, the question becomes whether a reviewing
court should defer to that opinion or substitute its own judgment for that of
the agency.
In this way, when an agency has included a severability clause in a rule, the
who-decides question raises questions familiar from scholarly discussions of
the Chevron doctrine. Just as we need a doctrine for determining whether a re-
viewing court should defer to an agency's interpretation of a federal statute, so
too we need a doctrine for determining whether a reviewing court should defer
to an agency's opinion on severability expressed through a severability clause.
We now consider whether a reviewing court should defer to a promulgating
agency's answer to the intent and workability questions.
31. Davis County II, io8 F. 3 d at 14S5.
32. Id. at 146o (quoting K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 294).
33. See supra note i and accompanying text.
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1. Agency Intent
The first question for the reviewing court to consider is whether the prom-
ulgating agency would have wanted the remainder to stay in effect had it con-
templated that a court would invalidate the challenged provision?4 On its face,
an administrative severability clause is the agency's affirmative answer to that
question.3" A typical administrative severability clause, for example, reads as
follows: "The provisions of this part are separate and severable from one an-
other. If any provision is stayed or determined to be invalid, it is the Commis-




The case for judicial deference on the intent question is straightforward.
The regulatory text is strong evidence of the agency's intent. 7 When an admin-
istrative rule contains a severability clause, it is odd for a court to conduct an
independent inquiry into whether the agency intended for the remainder to
stay in effect. To do so amounts to a search for the agency's putative intent
when the rule already contains a statement of the agency's actual intent.
Moreover, when a court searches for putative intent under these circum-
stances, it likely lacks a coherent objective. Recall that the inquiry into an agen-
cy's putative intent attempts to recreate the bargain between stakeholders that
gave rise to the regulation. But the court must suppose that the severability
clause, as part of the regulatory text, is itself part of the regulatory bargain, 8 It
34. Davis County II, io8 F.3d at 1459 (quoting North Carolina v. FERC, 73o F.2d 790, 795-96
(D.C. Cit. 1984)) ("Whether an administrative agency's order or regulation is severable...
depends on the issuing agency's intent.").
35. Cf David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 649 n.51
(20o8) (suggesting that severability clauses "settle, once and for all, the question of legisla-
tive intent"). For similar reasons, some commentators have argued for a plain meaning rule
for statutory severability clauses. See Movsesian, supra note 11, at 73-82; Nagle, supra note in,
at 234-46; Shumsky, supra note 15, at 245-67.
36. FTC Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.13 (2014) (emphasis add-
ed); see also 7o Fed. Reg. 25,654, 25,656 (May 13, 2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.18)
("The Department wishes to make its intent clear that should all or any part of this regula-
tion be set aside, the Department does not intend that the prior rule be reinstated, in whole
or in part.") (emphasis added); Applications for FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Pa-
tent Submission and Listing Requirements and Application of 3o-Month Stays on Approval
of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying that a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid
or Will Not Be Infringed, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,695-96 (2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314).
37. See generally John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. CT. REV. 113 (describing the
modern "textually structured approach to purposivism"); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regu-
lations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012).
38. Indeed, some severability clauses recognize the importance of a regulatory provision while
providing that the provision is nonetheless severable from the remainder. For example, in




is therefore questionable whether the court could properly find that the regula-
tory bargain implies that the challenged provision is inseverable. Consequently,
we think there is a compelling case for judicial deference to the plain meaning
of a severability clause with respect to the promulgating agency's intent.
2. Workability of the Remainder
The second question for the reviewing court to consider is whether the re-
mainder is workable. Unlike the intent question, severability clauses do not al-
ways address this aspect of the severability decision expressly. Still, it is fair to
read a severability clause as providing the agency's opinion on workability be-
cause workability is such a prominent consideration-perhaps the most promi-
nent consideration- in the severability decision. Therefore, like the intent
question, courts should give deference to the agency's opinion on workability
when it is expressed in a severability clause. Below, we provide four reasons
that the regulatory environment would benefit if courts gave deference to the
agency's answer to the workability question, expressed through an administra-
tive severability clause.
a. Expertise
Agencies are often better equipped than courts to determine whether a reg-
ulatory remainder is workable because they have greater subject-matter exper-
tise. Agency expertise has several sources. First, agencies are highly specialized.
Federal agencies are differentiated by subject matter, and each agency's staff
spends most of its time and resources addressing issues related to the agency's
particular substantive domain. As a result, the staff becomes more knowledge-
We remind stations and MVPDs that they must always utilize their audio pass-
through equipment so that it does not harm the RP-compliant programming they
receive and transmit to their viewers. We note that this safe harbor is an important
but severable element of our compliance and enforcement scheme. We are estab-
lishing it to simplify our enforcement process for the benefit of stations and
MVPDs, but it is not so fundamental to the scheme as a whole that the CALM Act
regulations adopted in the item would be unenforceable in its absence. If the safe
harbor is declared invalid or unenforceable for any reason, it is our intent that the
remaining CALM Act regulations shall remain in full force and effect.
Implementation of the Commercial Advertisement Loudness Mitigation (CALM) Act, 77
Fed. Reg. 40,276, 40,285 n.132 (July 9, 2012) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73, 76) (emphasis
added).
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able about the policies and methods that work in that domain. 9 Second, agen-
cy personnel usually include staff members who have advanced training in
fields such as economic analysis and the scientific disciplines. The EPA's staff,
for example, includes scientists and economists tasked with evaluating the
EPA's regulatory and enforcement efforts. Similarly, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission employs economists and lawyers with advanced training
in economics to determine the best rules for detecting and preventing securities
fraud.4° Finally, executive-branch agencies are subject to review by the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), whose staff of economists and
other experts requires agencies to justify major rulemakings through cost-
benefit analysis.41 "[J]udges," by contrast, "are not expert in the field."42 They
are generalists who decide cases across various subject matters. Judges also
have relatively limited resources and staff who rarely have highly advanced
training in economics and related disciplines. Finally, courts have limited in-
vestigative powers and must decide each case based on the facts that are pre-
sented by the parties.
An agency's superior subject-matter expertise typically means that the
agency is better able than courts to make informed policy judgments. This is
one reason why, under Chevron, a reviewing court will defer to an agency's rea-
sonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency is charged with
implementing. Similarly, agencies are better equipped to determine whether a
regulatory remainder is workable because, in many instances, this inquiry re-
quires a deep understanding of the subject matter of the regulation itself.
Consider, for example, the Clean Power Plan. As explained above, the Plan
sets carbon pollution emissions goals for the states by identifying four "build-
ing blocks," which the agency has determined together make up the "best sys-
tem of emission reduction."43 The Plan's severability clause provides that if a
court sets aside any of the building blocks, then the remainder of the Plan
39. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis
of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies To Interpret Statutes, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 411,
421.
40. Id. at 422.
41. Id. at 422; Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1268-70 (2006); Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 821-30 (2003); Thomas 0.
McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 5o ADMIN. L. REv. 7, 40-48 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARv. L. REv. 1838, 1844-
54 (2013).
42. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
43. Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility





should stay in effect. 44 If a federal court invalidates one of the building blocks,
the court must determine whether the remainder of the regulation is workable
in the absence of the invalid provision. This inquiry inherently involves deter-
mining whether the remaining building blocks could sensibly be thought to
constitute the "best system of emission reduction."45 Put plainly, this is a ques-
tion that the EPA- the agency with experience implementing the Clean Air
Act- is best equipped to answer.
46
The Clean Power Plan is not unique in this respect. Many regulatory
schemes are very technical and complex, and they often involve highly interde-
pendent provisions.47 In fact, every indication is that regulatory schemes are
becoming more complex each year.48 Further, as we explain below, agencies
rarely use severability clauses. Thus, when an agency does include a severability
clause in a rule, it may indicate that the rule is especially technical and complex
and that the agency fears that a court may incorrectly associate complexity with
the rule's supposed inability to function absent a challenged provision.
In light of the highly technical and complex nature of modern regulation
and the agency practice of only rarely including severability clauses in rules,
generalist judges should defer to an expert agency that has offered its opinion
through an administrative severability clause on the workability of a regulatory
remainder. A court should not substitute its policy judgment for the agency's.49
Instead, courts should defer to the expert agency's opinion on whether the re-
mainder is workable.
b. Accountability
Deference to the agency's answer to the workability question as expressed
in a severability clause also makes the regulatory scheme more accountable to
44. Id. at 34,892.
45. For a suggestion that the effect of certain "building blocks" might be "negative" without the
others, see Anthony Paul, Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer & Sophie Pan, The Future of the
U.S. Power Sector: Implications of the Clean Power Plan, Presentation at the NYU Institute
for Policy Integrity Forum (Oct. 28, 2014).
46. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 6o (1975).
47. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1449, 1456 (2011).
48. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. L.J. 833, 861-62
(2001).
49. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); cf.
Gans, supra note 35, at 643 (arguing that statutory severability often "enmesh[es] the judici-
ary in policy choices that are better left to the legislative branch").
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the public. To understand the significance of democratic accountability in this
context, one must realize that the severability decision imposes upon the public
a regulatory scheme not approved in its exact form by the agency. It has long
been a fundamental principle of administrative law that a reviewing court may
not affirm an agency decision on a ground different from that adopted by the
agency to justify its action."0 This principle, generally called the Chenery doc-
trine, reflects the fact that Congress has given the authority to make rules to
the expert agency and not to the court. When the court affirms on a ground not
adopted by the agency, it invades the proper province of the agency by substi-
tuting its judgment for the agency's. Severability raises similar issues. When a
court upholds a portion of an administrative rule but sets aside others, the
court leaves in place a regulatory scheme different from the scheme promulgat-
ed by the agency. And if the reviewing court sets aside the remainder, it creates
a regulatory scheme (or perhaps deregulatory scheme) that the agency purpose-
fully rejected by promulgating the rule.
These considerations do not lead us to the conclusion, which at least one
scholar has reached, that severing a challenged provision of a rule constitutes
unconstitutional judicial lawmaking."1 Rather, they underscore the importance
of allocating the workability question to the institution with the greater demo-
cratic pedigree. The workability question implicates compromises among con-
stituents' interests -compromises that led to the creation of various regulatory
objectives ultimately memorialized in the final rule. More direct lines of ac-
countability to constituents provide agencies with a better understanding of
these compromises and therefore with a better understanding of whether a
regulatory remainder will adequately serve those regulatory objectives.5 2
so. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery
1), 318 U.S. 8o (1943). As often happens in the law, the rationale for Chenery Iwas better ex-
plained when the Court reflected on its earlier decision in Chenety II than in the original de-
cision itself.
51. In the context of statutes, Tom Campbell has argued that severance violates the Constitu-
tion's bicameralism-and-presentment requirements. In Campbell's view, just as the Presi-
dent and Congress cannot exercise line-item or one-house vetoes, so too the courts cannot
leave in place laws that have not gone through Article I, Section 7's requirements for law-
making. See Campbell, supra note 15, at 1503; see also Lars Noah, The Executive Line Item Veto
and the Judicial Power To Sever: What's the Difference?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 235, 236-41
(1999) (mentioning this argument, but not asserting it); Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative
Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 22 (1984) (same). But see
Dorsey, supra note 15, at 885-89 (showing that this view would undermine many provisions
of the U.S. Code). We presume that Campbell would hold a similar view about administra-
tive rules.
s2. Cf Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 47, at 1456-57 (discussing the supposed accountabil-
ity benefits of Seminole Rock deference); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judi-




Many scholars of administrative law have argued that agencies have more
direct lines of accountability to the public than the courts.53 Agency procedural
requirements for rulemaking are one line of accountability. When an agency
disseminates a proposed rule, including one containing a severability clause, it
must provide a "[ g]eneral notice of proposed rule making" 4 and "give interest-
ed persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submis-
sion of written data, views, or arguments.""5
These procedural mechanisms for maintaining accountability between the
public and the agencies can be significant to an agency's decision to promulgate
a severability clause because the severability of regulatory provisions is often
sufficiently important to induce stakeholders to comment formally. For exam-
ple, in a comment on a proposed Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) Rule, the
Alaska Oil and Gas Association (AOGA) wrote:
Regardless of the form of the final rule, AOGA urges FWS to make a
finding of severability. A severability finding would determine that the
provisions of this rule, and the various applications of the rule, are dis-
tinct and severable from one another.... A severability finding would
ensure that if any provision or application of the 4 (d) rule is stayed or
invalidated, such a stay or invalidation will not affect other provisions
or applications to other persons or circumstances. 6
When the public does participate, agencies are required to respond to the
public's comments in a reasoned fashion.? Moreover, an agency's final rule
(same); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
559, 569-70 (2006) (same). For a discussion of how deference to administrative severability
clauses is similar to Seminole Rock deference, see infra notes 176-184 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363
(1986); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2373-74 (2001);
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511;
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2o71, 2086-87
(1990).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
55. Id. § 553(c); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 59, 59 (1995) ("[R]ulemaking enhances fairness by allowing all potentially af-
fected members of the public to participate in the decisionmaking process that determines
rules that apply to their conduct[.]").
56. Letter from Marilyn Crockett, Exec. Dir., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass'n, to U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service 12 (July 14, 20o8), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FWS-R7-ES
-2008-0027-0083 [http://perma.cc/D633-NH6D].
57. We note, however, that agencies have discretion to decide how to address comments. See
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1355 n.15 (D.C. Cit. 1985) ("An agency need not
address every conceivable issue or alternative no matter how remote or insignificant.");
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must be a "logical outgrowth" of the agency's proposed rule,ss and the agency
must address relevant and significant comments raised during the rulemaking
in its statement of basis and purpose.5 9 These notice-and-comment require-
ments serve to "reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties
after governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agen-
cies.,6 Notice-and-comment requirements thus give the public an opportunity
to exercise accountability over an agency's decision to promulgate a severability
clause.
Courts are less responsive to the wishes of the President and Congress than
federal administrative agencies. 6 ' The federal courts are subject to a variety of
controls by the democratic branches, including control over the federal courts'
budget and jurisdiction. But at the level of individual judges, the political
branches have no official influence over the decisions of courts in particular
cases. 62 Of course, the President with the advice and consent of the Senate ap-
points individual judges. But once confirmed, federal judges enjoy lifetime ap-
pointments and undiminished pay, and they can be removed by the political
branches only through the Constitution's onerous impeachment procedures.
Indeed, part of the attraction of placing some decisions in the hands of federal
judges is that they enjoy a great degree of removal from the whims and impuls-
es of the political branches and of public opinion.
To be sure, one should not overestimate the democratic responsiveness of
administrative agencies to the popular will. Unlike agency heads, career agency
staff members are not subject to the political pressures imposed by Congress or
the President. 6, Many statutes also provide exemptions to participation-
enhancing notice-and-comment procedures. The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), which controls agency procedures when a more specific organic act
Reyblatt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F. 3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("An agency
need not address every comment, but it must respond in a reasoned manner to those that
raise significant problems.").
58. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 626 F.3d 84, 94-95
(D.C. Cit. 2010).
S9. See PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
60. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 198o); see also HENRY S. RICHARDSON,
DEMoCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 219-20, 251 (2002)
(asserting that notice-and-comment rulemaking is the most democratic form of administra-
tive rulemaking).
61. For an account of how agencies can undermine accountability to the President, see generally
Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1755 (2013).
62. See generally John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
InstitutionalizingJudicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2002).





does not, exempts an agency from undertaking notice and comment for rules
regulating certain subject matters, such as foreign affairs, national security, and
internal personnel matters. 6' There are also exemptions if the rule is an inter-
pretive rule or policy statement, or when the agency has good cause not to fol-
low notice-and-comment requirements. 6' Further, even when agencies do fol-
low notice-and-comment procedures, these procedures are often more a means
for ensuring favorable judicial review than they are a means of facilitating gen-
uine public participation. 66
But even if we cannot be uniformly sanguine about the power of formal
procedural requirements to ensure genuine accountability and participation,
we still maintain that agencies are also more responsive than the courts to rep-
resentatives in the legislative and executive branches. 6' The heads of executive-
branch agencies are appointed and removable by the President. The heads of
so-called "independent" agencies are also appointed by the President (though
they can usually be removed only for cause), and the budgets of such agencies
are prepared by the Office of Management and Budget.65
Agencies are also subject to oversight by Congress. They are subject to the
budgetary control of congressional committees, and their heads frequently tes-
tify before Congress. As a result of these formal and other informal mecha-
nisms of oversight, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer have argued that "agen-
cies usually have institutionally superior access to the original expectations of
the legislators .... [and] also have better knowledge than courts about current
64. See 5 U.S.C. § 552-556 (2012).
65. Id.
66. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 63, at 231-32; E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41
DUKE L.J. 1490, 1490 (1992); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1, 12 (1997). But see Mariano-Florentino Cu~llar, Rethinking Regulato-
ry Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 411, 463 (2005) ("Even though agencies have both the in-
centive and the opportunity to anticipate political reactions to their regulations, the notice
and comment process is not treated as a charade. Agencies in these case studies often re-
spond to comments by making substantive changes in their regulations. Their lawyers
grapple with concerns raised by the commenters. At the same time, they change the pro-
posed laws in response to feedback from interested parties.").
67. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 86S-66 (1984);
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Matthew D. Adler, Ju-
dicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA.
L. REV. 759, 875-76 (1997); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-99 (1985).
68. See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency
Independent?, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 273, 287-92 (1993) (discussing how the Department of
Justice has affected legal decision making by the EEOC).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
congressional expectations." 6' Further, some theorists posit that procedural re-
quirements on regulation, such as notice-and-comment procedures, are means
for Congress to intervene more easily when an agency is not adequately ad-
dressing the concerns of powerful constituencies.' 0
In short, the public and representatives in the executive and legislative
branches maintain comparatively robust controls for holding agencies account-
able in relation to the courts. Thus, when an agency opines on the workability
of a regulatory remainder, it is in a better position than a court to know how
the remainder will affect citizens and other entities.
c. Rule ofLaw
When a reviewing court defers to an administrative severability clause, it
also promotes two important aspects of the rule of law: predictability and sta-
bility. 71
Predictability benefits both agencies and regulated entities by encouraging
efficient investment. When regulated entities evaluate which resources to in-
vest in complying with the law most efficiently, an important consideration,
especially for sophisticated actors, is how courts will treat recently promulgated
administrative rules. If certain provisions of a rule are unlikely to survive judi-
cial review, then entities may make different investment choices from the
choices they would make if the provisions were likely to survive.
Similarly, greater predictability in the law allows agencies to determine
how to use rulemaking resources most efficiently. Without severability, the
probability that a court will set aside any particular provision is partly a func-
tion of the probability that a court will set aside any other provision in the same
rule. Thus, the assessment of how best to regulate (for an agency) or how best
to comply with the law (for regulated entities) is to some extent a function of
how likely a court is to find potentially unlawful provisions severable. An agen-
cy's regulatory choices, for example, will depend on the probability it assigns to
the possibility that a court will set aside certain provisions. If an agency is fairly
69. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. 1o83,
1176-77 (2008) (citations omitted); Eskridge, supra note 39, at 425-26.
70. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 18o (1999).
71. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-76 (1980); LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 37-52 (1969); JOSEPH RAz, THE AuTHORIrY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 210-31 (2d ed. 2009).
72. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-




certain that a court will defer to a severability clause, however, it may choose to
promulgate a set of controversial regulations as a single rule rather than dis-
persing the regulations across several rules.
By adhering to a deference framework for administrative severability claus-
es, courts would mitigate some of the uncertainty in this probabilistic assess-
ment. This point follows from the timing in which a severability clause appears
in the interbranch dialogue. While a reviewing court can determine the worka-
bility of a regulatory remainder only after invalidating a challenged provision
in litigation, an agency can use a severability clause to answer the workability
question at the time the final rule is promulgated. So if federal courts deferred to
severability clauses, the workability question would be one less element of pos-
sible uncertainty in the law.
Judicial deference to administrative severability clauses also promotes
greater stability in regulatory schemes. A "remand-and-repromulgation cycle,"
as we call it, occurs when a regulation passes back and forth between an agency
and the courts. If an agency could reliably influence how a reviewing court
would make the severability decision by including a severability clause in a
rule, then it could reduce the number of times it must re-promulgate a regula-
tory remainder that a court has erroneously invalidated.'
Reducing these cycles would save agencies and regulated entities costs
caused by legal flux. 4 Agencies would save scarce resources in two ways. Ex
ante, an agency's drafting costs will be reduced because, assured in the
knowledge that a severability clause will prevent the vacatur of an entire rule-
making, the agency will not have to engage in as rigorous of an assessment of
the likelihood that each provision of a rule will be struck down. In this way, ju-
dicial deference to administrative severability clauses would partially offset
some of the drawbacks associated with agency ossification. 7 Ex post, agencies
73. Id. at 823.
74. See Levin, supra note 16, at 300; Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Admin-
istrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1723 (2011); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and
Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 623
(2004). To be clear, we do not propose that courts consider these costs in individual cases
because doing so would potentially violate the APA. See MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v.
FCC (MD/DC/DE Broadcasters II), 253 F.3d 732, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the APA
does not permit courts to consider the agency's costs in curing an invalid rule). However,
courts should consider these costs when crafting judicial presumptions and rules of defer-
ence.
75. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DuKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) [hereinafter McGarity, Some Thoughts]; Thomas 0. McGarity,
The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L.
REv. 525, 528-36 (1997) [hereinafter McGarity, The Courts]; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
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will save costs associated with re-promulgating rules already put through no-
tice and comment. 6 These costs are significant. One study, which one of the
authors and Peter Schuck conducted in 1989, concluded that post-remand pro-
ceedings at the agency level took an average of seventeen months to complete. 7
True, to receive deference on its answer to the workability question, the
agency must draft a severability clause and take it through notice and com-
ment. This process involves non-negligible costs, especially when the regulato-
ry scheme is highly technical or complex. The agency may also incur costs asso-
ciated with litigation over the meaning and scope of the severability clause.
78
But on average these costs pale in comparison to the average costs of redrafting
a rule and taking it back through notice and comment.
Reducing the incidence of remand-and-repromulgation cycles would also
save costs for regulated entities. A regulated entity, relying on an unchallenged
portion of a rule and caught in such a cycle, must first adapt to the agency's
rule, readapt to a regulatory vacuum after vacatur, and adapt for a third time to
the original rule's valid provisions after the agency re-promulgates those provi-
sions.79 But if a court's deference to an administrative severability clause pre-
vented the court from erroneously invalidating the remainder, then the regu-
lated entity would only need to adjust once.
Despite an administrative severability clause, there may be times when the
remainder may turn out to be unworkable. This might occur, for example,
when the agency does not correctly foresee what part of the rule might be
struck down or how the regulatory remainder might function in the absence of
the invalid portion. In these circumstances, a court's deference to the severabil-
ity clause may entail additional costs for regulated entities. In particular, regu-
lated entities relying on an unchallenged portion of a rule will have to change
their behavior when the agency first promulgates the rule and also when the
agency changes the rule after deciding that the remainder is unworkable. How-
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REv. 483, 489-90 (1997).
76. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162, 21,244 (Apr. 9,
2012) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219) ("The Department retained the [severability] pro-
vision in the final rule, because rulemaking is an extensive Departmental and public under-
taking, and the entire rule should not be dismissed if a court finds only a portion of the rule
is inappropriate.").
77. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Fed-
eral Administrative Law, 199o DUKE L.J. 984, 1050.
78. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 350
(2003) (making a similar point about litigation over Chevron's domain); Merrill, supra note
72, at 825 (same).




ever, these occasions are likely to be rare for two reasons. First, the agency's
expertise with respect to the workability question suggests that when the agen-
cy includes a severability clause, the remainder of the statute will be workable.
Second, if agencies (and commenters) know that their judgments about sever-
ability are likely to carry dispositive weight with the courts in the future, they
can be expected to devote more time and attention to these issues. This will
lead to more accurate projections of workability. Together, these considera-
tions suggest that the aggregate costs of correcting for ill-conceived severability
clauses are still likely outweighed by the cost-savings of preventing remand-
and-repromulgation cycles.
Bearing in mind that courts currently do not defer to administrative sever-
ability clauses, one might also argue that there is a certain irony in advocating
for change in the law as a way of making the law more stable8' As the Supreme
Court has explained in a different context, "[w]hat is of paramount importance
is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive
rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts. "s' One might
then think that courts should not change their treatment of administrative sev-
erability clauses because lawyers in the agencies should have a stable back-
ground against which to draft administrative rules.
If, however, an agency could reliably predict whether a court will defer to a
severability clause, then the agency could reliably predict "the effect of the lan-
guage it adopts. ",8 While changing the doctrine would disrupt the judicial
background against which agencies currently regulate, the change would ulti-
mately give the agencies more control over the consequences of their rules. We
therefore advocate a change in the secondary rules of administrative law to make
the primary rules more stable.8 3
d. Efficiency
Finally, if agency regulatory (or, for that matter, deregulatory) actions are
generally socially beneficial, then judicial deference to the agency's answer to
8o. See Nagle, supra note 11, at 245-46. See generally John F. Manning, Continuity and the Legisla-
tive Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1863,1864-65 (2004).
81. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
82. Id.; see also Nagle, supra note ii, at 245-46 (providing several justifications for changing the
test for severability).
83. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 8o-81 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining the distinction be-
tween primary and secondary rules).
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the workability question promotes the development of efficient rules. 4 When a
court erroneously invalidates an entire rule that the agency would not itself re-
scind, society bears the costs associated with a "regulatory gap" (or, in the case
of deregulation, a "regulatory glut") between invalidation and re-promulgation
of the regulatory remainder. Moreover, this gap or glut may prove indefinitely
long because agencies are sometimes able to promulgate a rule that they can-
not, for political or fiscal reasons, later re-promulgate.8" For example, the inter-
state air pollution rules were upheld by the Supreme Court in EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P.86 after almost a twenty-year delay stretching back
over three presidential administrations to the 1998 NOx SIP call.
Another potential efficiency gain, which is more controversial, derives from
the fact that judicial deference to administrative severability clauses promotes
dynamic agency interpretations of statutes.8, If courts would generally defer to
administrative severability clauses, then a promulgating agency, knowing that
a reviewing court is unlikely to vacate the entire rule, can more freely promul-
gate regulatory provisions that interpret statutes in new ways. As a conse-
quence, the agency can more dynamically interpret statutes with rules contain-
ing a severability clause than rules without. 88 The Clean Power Plan provides a
good example of this phenomenon. Some experts doubt that a final rule based
on the Clean Power Plan would be a valid exercise of the agency's delegated au-
thority under the Clean Air Act. 89 The EPA is aware of these criticisms, and one
aspect of its strategy for dealing with them was to include the severability
84. See Levin, supra note 16, at 298-99; Meazell, supra note 74, at 1725. We recognize that those
who hold a view according to which the proper role of the administrative state is rather lim-
ited may disagree with the assumption in this sentence.
85. See McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 75, at 1401.
86. 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
87. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ch. 2 (1994) (explain-
ing the inevitability of dynamic statutory interpretation).
88. A theoretical and empirical literature suggests that a similar adjustment in agency behavior
occurred after the Court first announced the Chevron framework. See Linda Cohen & Mat-
thew Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 67-68 (1994)
(predicting that remand rates would equilibrate as agencies became more aggressive in their
statutory interpretations); Schuck & Elliott, supra note 77, at 1043 (explaining that Chevron
caused agencies to begin changing the grounds on which they based their decisions); Mat-
thew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formali-
ty, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 558 (2oo6).
89. See, e.g., Brian H. Potts & David R. Zappo, EPA's Clean Power Play: Who Needs Congress?, 27
ELEcTRICITY J. 26 (2014); Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed, The Clean Power Plan Is Unconstitu-





clause, hoping that a reviewing court will defer to that clause if the court sets
aside one or more of the four building blocks.
One potential rejoinder to the efficiency argument is that severability claus-
es make controversial rules more likely to be partially set aside, either because
(i) expressing a position on the severability of a particular provision puts a tar-
get on the tenuous provision; or (2) courts are more willing to invalidate regu-
latory provisions when they need not invalidate the entire rule. On this view,
even someone who thinks that agency actions generally conduce to the social
good may thus conclude that an agency should not include a severability clause
in a rule that is likely to be litigated because doing so makes a regulatory provi-
sion more likely to be set aside.
With respect to the first concern, we doubt that agency opinions on severa-
bility actually make legally suspect provisions of administrative rules signifi-
cantly more likely to be challenged. Elite law firms scrutinize every rule that af-
fects concentrated interests, either on the instructions of their existing clients
or in the hope of attracting new ones. We doubt that there are many potentially
problematic provisions that would be noticed only if the agency included a sev-
erability clause.
With respect to the second concern - that courts are more willing to set
aside provisions contained in rules with a severability clause-we have two ob-
servations. First, the argument assumes that courts should leave in place a so-
cially beneficial yet unlawful provision. One might disfavor unlawful regulatory
provisions on principle, however, even if they are in fact socially beneficial. Se-
cond, even assuming that unlawful yet socially beneficial regulations are desir-
able, one must weigh the costs of relinquishing those regulations against the
costs of erroneous vacatur of entire rules. Although it is impossible to quantify
these social costs, we think the latter, even if less frequent, are likely to be
greater in the aggregate.
To summarize the argument thus far, the severability decision involves two
questions: (1) would the agency have intended the regulatory remainder to stay
in effect in the absence of the challenged provision?; and (2) is the remainder
lawful? We have argued that a promulgating agency, rather than a reviewing
court, is best positioned to answer these questions. As the next Part explains,
however, this is not the modern doctrine on administrative severability clauses.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In fact, the D.C. Circuit has stated that severability clauses will rarely be dis-
positive of the severability decision.9"
II. THE STRANGE DEARTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEVERABILITY
CLAUSES
The previous Part argued for a particular allocation of decision-making au-
thority on severability in administrative law: courts should defer to agency-
promulgated severability clauses. For that division of labor to materialize, how-
ever, agencies must promulgate rules containing severability clauses, and
courts must develop a framework for deferring to them.
In this Part, we turn our sights to judicial doctrine and administrative prac-
tice and show that neither condition obtains. In Part II.A, we focus on the
courts. Federal judicial doctrine on administrative severability clauses is largely
a re-application of the doctrine on statutory severability clauses to the adminis-
trative context. We briefly survey the doctrine on statutory severability clauses,
explaining that it does not require courts to defer to severability clauses. We
then show that this doctrine has been transmogrified into a doctrine of admin-
istrative law. In Part II.B, we show that administrative agencies rarely incorpo-
rate severability clauses into their rules. We posit that agencies usually do not
consider including severability clauses in their rules because they do not receive
a deference pay-off when they do. We conclude, therefore, that if courts want
to capture the potential benefits of administrative severability clauses discussed
in Part I, then they need to develop a framework for evaluating administrative
severability clauses that would give these clauses some appreciable measure of
deference.
A. De Novo Review by the Courts
Just as courts have applied the same test to determine the severability of
both statutes and administrative rules,9 ' they have applied the same framework
for evaluating the effect of severability clauses. This section therefore begins
with a brief overview of the development of judicial doctrine on statutory sev-
erability clauses. 92
go. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (quot-
ing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968)).
gi. See supra Part I.A.
92. The historical discussion that follows owes much to outstanding earlier treatments in




According to John Nagle, severability clauses began to appear in state and
federal statutes in the late nineteenth century and had become common by
191o. 9' Before the appearance of severability clauses, the federal courts had
long presumed that partially unconstitutional statutes were severable, unless
the provisions of the statutory remainder were so intertwined with the chal-
lenged provisions as to make the remainder unworkable. 94
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the emerging phenomenon of
statutory severability clauses in the 1914 Ohio Tax Cases.95 There, the Court ac-
cepted the statute's severability clause at face value. The Court, in leaving the
remainder in place, assumed that the severability clause meant that the legisla-
ture intended for the statutory remainder to stay in effect.96
In the subsequent two decades, the Court moved further and further away
from the literalist approach to severability clauses. In Hill v. Wallace, decided in
1922, the Court maintained that a severability clause expresses the legislature's
intent for the remainder of a statute to stay in effect97 but declined to defer to
the clause's plain meaning. 98 The Court for the first time noted a basis on
which a reviewing court might second-guess the plain meaning of a severabil-
ity clause: to wit, the interconnectedness of the statute's provisions might
demonstrate that the legislature would have intended for the court to strike the
entire statute down, notwithstanding the severability clause.99 And in Dorchy v.
Kansas, decided in 1924, the Court for the first time advised that a severability
clause "provides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid in determin-
ing [legislative] intent. But it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command."'"
In 1928, the Court announced an even greater departure from a literal con-
struction of severability clauses. In Williams v. Standard Oil Co., the Court con-
firmed that interconnectedness was a basis for doubting a severability clause's
ostensible meaning and also added a second basis: a court could disregard a
severability clause if there were "considerations which make evident" that "the
93. Nagle, supra note 11, at 222.
94. See Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 (188o) (citing Warren v. Mayor & Alderman of
Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854)).
95. 232 U.S. 576 (1914).
96. Id. at 594.
97. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 (1922) (noting that the severability clause "furnishes assur-
ance to courts that they may properly sustain separate sections or provisions of a partly inva-
lid act without hesitation or doubt as to whether they would have been adopted, even if the
legislature had been advised of the invalidity of part").
98. Id. at 70.
99. Id.
loo. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924).
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legislature would not have been satisfied with what remains [after a court
strikes down the challenged provision]. " '1 More significantly, the Court re-
versed the presumption in favor of severability for statutes that do not contain
a severability clause. The Court held that a severability clause creates a pre-
sumption of severability, but the absence of such a clause creates a presump-
tion "that the legislature intends an act to be effective as an entirety.
The early twentieth-century doctrine on severability clauses began to crys-
tallize in Carter v. Carter Coal Co."0 3 According to Carter Coal, statutes are pre-
sumed inseverable.' °4 A severability clause creates a presumption of severabil-
ity, but that presumption can "be overcome by considerations which establish
'the clear probability that ... the Legislature would not have been satisfied
with [the remainder]. '"""O Legislative intent determines whether "the provi-
sions of a statute are so interwoven that[,] one being held invalid[,] the others
must fall. ',,, 6 Robert Stern offered the following synopsis of the law at the
time: "Separability clauses are thus now significant only because of their ab-
sence. Like articles of clothing, if they are present little attention is paid to
them, but if they are absent they may be missed."" 7
Carter Coal's view of the significance of severability clauses largely persists,
except that the Court no longer presumes that a statute is inseverable when a
statute does not contain a severability clause. The leading modern case on stat-
utory severability is Alaska Airlines. According to that widely cited case:
[W]hen Congress has explicitly provided for severance by including a
severability clause in the statute[,] . . . the inclusion of such a clause
creates a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the
statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally of-
fensive provision .... [But] Congress' silence is just that- silence- and
does not raise a presumption against severability. 'o8
Alaska Airlines thus acknowledged that severability clauses create a presump-
tion of severability, but it confirmed that statutes without a severability clause
101. 278 U.S. 235, 242 (1928).
10a. Id. at 241.
103. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
104. Id. at 312.
105. Id. at 312 (quoting Williams, 278 U.S. 242).
106. Id. at 313.
1o7. Stern, supra note 11, at 122.
lo8. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987).
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are not presumed inseverable.'0 9 As noted earlier, Alaska Airlines also retained
the two bases for finding a statute containing a severability clause nonetheless
inseverable: "Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted
those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a
law. , 11°
The Court has not clarified the strength of the presumption in favor of sev-
erability created by a severability clause, but the case law suggests that the pre-
sumption is rather weak. The Court has repeatedly said that "a severability
clause is an 'aid merely; not an inexorable command"' 1 and that "whatever
relevance such an explicit clause might have in creating a presumption of sever-
ability, . . . the ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the
presence or absence of such a clause."' 2
The behavior of subsequent courts has borne out these observations. In
several cases involving the severability decision, lower courts have ignored the
existence of a severability clause."' And in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held the
remainder of the Federal Election Campaign Act to be severable from its un-
constitutional provisions without citing the Act's severability clause."4 Even
when courts do not totally ignore a severability clause, the common trope is for
iog. In Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1984), the plurality held that a presumption of
severability exists even in the absence of a severability clause. But a majority of the Court has
not adopted that holding. Scholars nonetheless disagree about whether the current Court
presumes the severability of statutes not containing severability clauses. See Jona, supra note
15, at 704-05; Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 873,
884 (2005); Shumsky, supra note 15, at 243. Compare Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2668 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]hile the Court has sometimes ap-
plied at least a modest presumption in favor of... severability, it has not always done so."
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Klukowski, supra note 15, at 7-8
("[C]ontrary to what some scholars argue-without a severability clause there is ... a pre-
sumption [in favor of severability] only in the lower courts, not the Supreme Court."); and
Nagle, supra note 11, at 220-21, with Dorf, supra note 15, at 313 ("[A]ll the states and the fed-
eral government have a general default principle authorizing courts to sever invalid provi-
sions and applications from valid ones.").
11o. Id. at 684 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1o8 (1976) (per curiam)).
ni. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 n.49 (1997) (quoting Dorchy v. Kan.,
264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924)).
112. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 58S n.27 (1968); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 1014 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d mi8, 1128-29 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing severability with-
out noting the severability clause); Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1377 ( 7th Cir. 1988)
(Coffey, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for "completely disregard[ing] the statute's
severability clauses as if they didn't exist").
114. 424 U.S. at lO8-O9.
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a federal court opinion dealing with statutory severability issues to begin with a
rhetorical nod in the direction of a severability clause but then to analyze the
severability decision as if the clause did not exist.
Several of the Court's recent decisions illustrate this treatment of severabil-
ity clauses. In National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB),
both the majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg's separate opinion stated that
the Court would follow Congress's explicit instruction that the Medicaid ex-
pansion be severed from the rest of the Act."'1 However, the majority opinion
then proceeded to determine - as if it were a totally separate inquiry - "what
Congress would have intended in light of the Court's constitutional hold-
ing. ' 'n
6
Consider also the Court's decision last Term in Executive Benefits Insurance
Agency v. Arkison. 7 In an earlier case, Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a particular provision of the Bankruptcy
Code. Under section 157, bankruptcy courts may proceed to final judgment on
certain "core" claims"' and may offer proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law on certain "non-core" claims. "9 In Stern, the Court held that bankruptcy
courts lack constitutional authority to enter final judgment on state-law coun-
terclaims labeled as "core" under section 157 (b). 2 ' In Arkison, the Court con-
sidered whether Stern created a "gap" in the statute. According to the "gap"
theory, bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to enter final judgment
on certain core claims under Stern and lack statutory authority to make pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law as to those claims under section
157.21 The Court noted that the statute contains a severability clause and held
that the clause "closes the so-called 'gap.""' However, as in NFIB, the Court
then proceeded to analyze severability under the Alaska Airlines test as if the
severability clause did not exist.23 The Court's reasoning in NFIB and Arkison
11S. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) ("We then follow Congress's explicit textual instruction to leave
unaffected 'the remainder of the chapter, and the application of [the challenged] provision
to other persons or circumstances."'); id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("In view of the Chief Justice's disposi-
tion, I agree with him that the Medicaid Act's severability clause determines the appropriate
remedy.").
116. Id. at 2607 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005)).
117. 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).
118. 28 U.S.C. S 157 (b) (2012).
iig. Id. at 5 157(c).
120. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
121. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2172-73.




shows that the presumption in favor of severability is weak. Indeed, if the
Court took severability clauses at anything like face value, then those clauses
would not so quickly be set to one side. Much of what Robert Stern said in
1937 continues to be true today: "if [severability clauses] are present[,] little
attention is paid to them.""
We do not intend to criticize the courts' treatment of statutory severability
clauses. Indeed, in Part III, we suggest that considerations of institutional
competence may justify this treatment (though a full consideration of that is-
sue is outside the scope of this Article). Rather, the point has been to set the
stage for our discussion of administrative severability clauses. Earlier in the Ar-
ticle, we observed that the federal courts have, without much reflection, treated
the severability of administrative regulations as not relevantly different from
the severability of statutes. We noted that the Supreme Court's first and most
substantial discussion of severability in administrative law contained no cita-
tions but simply repurposed the Alaska Airlines test for use in cases involving
the severability of regulations. 2 ' Similarly, after an extensive discussion of the
statutory severability doctrine in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, a panel
of the D.C. Circuit wrote: "The [severability] analysis differs little in the con-
text of invalidating provisions of regulations promulgated by an agency.
Courts have thus assumed that the severability of statutes and of administrative
regulations raise virtually identical considerations.
Unlike the case law on statutory severability clauses, the case law on ad-
ministrative severability clauses is rather scarce. As the next section illustrates,
the scarcity is due primarily to the fact that administrative agencies rarely in-
clude severability clauses in their rules. The cases that do exist, however, sug-
gest that the federal courts also view administrative severability clauses as rais-
ing identical considerations to statutory severability clauses. Like severability
clauses in statutes, administrative severability clauses create a "presumption" of
severability.2 7 And as in the case of statutes, this presumption is largely unim-
portant under current jurisprudence. Indeed, borrowing from the Supreme
Court's cases on statutory severability clauses, the D.C. Circuit in reviewing a
Transit Authority regulation has stated that the "determination of severability
124. Stern, supra note 11, at 122.
12S. See supra Part I.A.
126. Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, lo F.3d 81z, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 15 F. 3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994), on reh'g, 56 F.3d lo5 (D.C. Cit. 1995), affd in
part, rev'd in part sub noma. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727 (1996).
127. High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 13-CV-o1723-RBJ, 2014 WL
4470427, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 11, 2014) ("I conclude that the severability clause creates a
presumption that the North Fork Exception is severable....").
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will rarely turn on the presence or absence of [a severability clause].12 We
conclude that the doctrine on administrative severability clauses, like the doc-
trine on statutory severability clauses, requires a reviewing court to recognize
only a weak presumption in favor of severability and does not require the court
to defer to an administrative severability clause.
The analysis in Part I suggested that regulatory schemes would benefit if
courts deferred to administrative severability clauses. Accordingly, we think a
reviewing court should adopt more than a weak presumption in favor of sever-
ability when the agency has chosen to include a severability clause in its rule.
As we explain in the next section, the federal courts' treatment of administra-
tive severability clauses has likely created a feedback loop between judicial doc-
trine and agency practice. Under the doctrine, courts do not defer to severabil-
ity clauses, and this leads agencies to not promulgate these clauses -a
consequence that in turn stunts the development of administrative severability
doctrine.
B. Neglect in the Agencies
This Article began by inspecting the severability clause in the EPA's ambi-
tious Clean Power Plan. Such clauses are rare. We have identified twenty-one
agencies that included a severability clause in at least one of their rules between
2000 and 2014.129 Among these agencies, the Federal Trade Commission
128. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (quoting
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968)); see also New York SMSA Ltd.
P'ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 603 F. Supp. 2d 715, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), affid 612 F.3d 97
(2d Cit. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("[T]he presence of [a severability] clause
is not dispositive.").
129. They include: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Bureau of Land Management,
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, Employment and
Training Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Forest Service,
National Indian Gaming Commission, National Labor Relations Board, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, National Park Service, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Postal Service. To compile this list,
we searched the Federal Register on Bloomberg Law for final rules containing either the
word "severability" or the word "severable," and then checked the results manually to elimi-
nate erroneous hits. Depending on how one counts agencies, one could conduct the same
exercise and arrive at numbers slightly different from those described in the main text. For
example, we decided to count the Food and Drug Administration, the Office of Population
Affairs, and the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services as
falling under HHS's umbrella. One could also reasonably count these as three separate
agencies. Doing so would add two agencies to our total of agencies using severability clauses
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(FTC) generated the highest volume of severability clauses. From 2000 to
2014, the FTC promulgated 2o6 rules, thirteen (6.3%) of which contained a
severability clause. After the FTC, the next most active users of severability
clauses from 2000 to 2014 were the EPA (with seven final rules containing a
severability clause), followed by the Federal Communications Commission and
the Forest Service (each with five) and the Federal Railroad Administration
(with four). All other agencies have included severability clauses in their rules
in three or fewer instances from 2000 to 2014.13' The normative significance of
our data-for example, whether they support the claim that agencies include
severability clauses in their rules too infrequently-is of course debatable. How-
ever, we think it is fair to conclude from the data that agencies infrequently in-
clude severability clauses in their rules.
Instead of including severability clauses in final rules, agencies tend to
clarify their positions on severability only when required to do so in litiga-
tion- that is, they formulate a position on severability only after they become
concerned that particular provisions of their rules are in jeopardy.'31 In conver-
sation, supervising lawyers at several agencies indicated that severability was
not a priority during notice and comment; rather, agency personnel assumed
that they would consider severability only when it became an imminent issue
in litigation. An informal survey of several former EPA General Counsels, in-
cluding one of the co-authors, indicated that the topic of including a severabil-
ity clause rarely came up, and when it did, agency general counsel staffs were
often reluctant to imply that there was even a possibility that portions of their
rule might be set aside. This attitude, while understandable, is myopic.
Waiting until litigation to opine on severability can have significant draw-
backs. While severability clauses must be promulgated according to statute-
prescribed procedural formalities -most commonly, notice-and-comment pro-
cedures-positions developed in litigation do not require such procedures. In-
and would reduce the concentration of severability clauses in a single agency's rules. Our
basic point that agencies rarely include severability clauses is not affected by how one indi-
viduates related agencies.
130. See infra Appendix for more detail.
131. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (asking for reconsideration
of severability in petition for rehearing); MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, 253 F.3d
732 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same); Virginia v. EPA, i16 F.3d 4 99, 500-01 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same);
Davis Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. v. EPA (Davis County II), io8 F.3d 1454, 1455 (D.C. Cit.
1997) (same); Davis Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. v. EPA, 1O1 F.3d 1395, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(Davis County I) (opining on severability at oral argument); Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jew-
. ell, 995 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013) (articulating an agency's position on severability in a
legal brief); Principal and Response Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 59-64, Nat'l
Ass'n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d 947 (No. 12-5o68 & 12-5138) (discussing the NLRB's severability ar-
gument).
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deed, trial and appellate briefs are typically confidential until the time they are
filed, and they are often reviewed only by a handful of agency lawyers. As a
consequence of these procedural differences, severability arguments raised in
litigation do not benefit regulatory regimes along the dimensions discussed in
Part I - expertise, accountability, the rule of law, and efficiency - at least not to
the same extent as severability clauses.
Severability opinions expressed through briefs are less likely to reflect the
agency's subject-matter expertise. Agency staff with advanced training in scien-
tific and economic analysis, for example, will often review legislative rules, but
not review legal briefs. The benefits of review by agency staff became particu-
larly evident in Davis County I and II. In Davis County I, operators of several ex-
isting municipal solid waste (MSW) combustor units challenged EPA's 1995
MSW combustion standards. The court held that the 1995 standards, as ap-
plied to small MSW combustors, exceeded EPA's statutory authority under
section 129 of the Clean Air Act.132 On the advice of the EPA's counsel at oral
argument, the court vacated the entire rule rather than severing the ultra vires
provision.133 In Davis County II, however, the EPA petitioned for rehearing on
the severability issue, conceding that the agency's counsel had not fully grasped
the workability of the regulatory provisions that would remain after the court's
ruling.'34 The Court of Appeals reinstated the standards except as applied to
small MSW combustors and cement kilns. 35 This was a close call for the agen-
cy and presumably for communities that are affected by pollution from MSW
combustors. Had the agency's position on severability been expressed through
a severability clause, rather than through a lawyer at oral argument, the agen-
cy's administrative expertise could have been brought more directly to bear on
the severability question confronting the court.
An administrative severability clause is also a more accountable and partici-
patory way for an agency to express its opinion on severability than a litigation
brief. As noted, to include a severability clause in a legislative rule pursuant to
the APA, an agency must provide a "[g]eneral notice of proposed rulemak-
ing,' 36 give "interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule mak-
ing" by submitting comments,' 37 and address significant comments in its
statement of basis and purpose."38 By contrast, for reasons of legal strategy, po-
132. Davis County I, lol F.3d at 1397.
133. Id. at 1411.
134. Davis County II, 1o8 F.3 d at 146o.
135. Id.
136. 5 U.S.C: § 553(b) (2012).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
138. See PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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sitions developed in litigation almost never involve participation by the public;
at most, a few litigants aligned with the agency may be consulted.
Severability clauses can also make regulatory schemes more predictable and
stable than positions on severability developed in litigation, due to the greater
prospectivity and formality of severability clauses. A severability clause in a rule
will always be promulgated far in advance of a legal brief opining on severabil-
ity. Therefore, a rule with a severability clause creates reliance interests that ad-
just for the possibility that some of the rule's provisions may be invalidated and
severed from the rest. By contrast, an agency develops a position on severabil-
ity in litigation only after regulated entities have begun to plan their affairs
around a rule's substantive provisions. Similarly, procedural requirements for
promulgating severability clauses make regulatory schemes more stable at the
margins because these requirements must be satisfied in order to rescind these
clauses once they are in effect. 39 Consequently, one expects fewer changes in
an agency's position on severability when the change is announced through a
severability clause rather than in a legal brief.
In light of the potential drawbacks of waiting until litigation to develop a
position on severability, why do agencies choose to wait rather than include a
severability clause in the text of a rule? While more research needs to be done
on this question, 4 one way to approach it is to compare an agency's decision
whether to include a severability clause in a rule with the choice between inter-
preting a federal statute using a legislative rule or using an informal agency ac-
tion.
Under Chevron, an agency interpreting a federal statute can choose either to
pay now or pay later. 4 The agency can "purchase" Chevron deference for its
139. See Nat'l Family Planning & Reproductive Health Assoc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (holding that a reversal of a prior agency action requires at least the extent of proce-
dural formality initially used in adopting the action).
140. We think it would be worthwhile to survey agencies' legislative counsels to determine why
agencies choose to include or not to include a severability clause in a rule. This research
would be a piece of the larger project of investigating the process of regulating "from the in-
side," similar to recent work that has begun to shed light on the process of legislative draft-
ing in Congress. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66
STAN. L. REv. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II]; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 9O1 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck &
Bressman, Part 1]; Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:
A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002). A recent article by Christopher
Walker takes the first step in this larger project. See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency In-
terpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999 (2015).
141. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Adminis-
trative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 461, 539 (2003); Elliott, supra note 66, at 1491; Merrill, supra
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interpretation by investing agency resources in costly notice-and-comment
procedures. If the agency does so, then its reward is less judicial scrutiny. Al-
ternatively, the agency can choose not to invest in formal procedures. But if it
does so, the agency might later have to "purchase" judicial approval through
stronger interpretive arguments evaluated under the less deferential Skidmore
framework.
The courts' doctrine on administrative severability clauses, however, does
not share Chevron/Skidmore's incentive structure. Promulgating a severability
clause through notice-and-comment procedures can be costly. It may entail
significant ex ante costs associated with investigating and reflecting on the var-
ious regimes that might result from an enforceable severability clause. Fur-
thermore, the agency may believe that a severability clause entails higher ex-
pected ex post costs. For example, an agency may be concerned that a
severability clause will make weaknesses in its regulatory program easier to de-
tect. Or an agency may think that a severability clause will weaken its position
in litigation, either because a court may wonder why the agency included a sev-
erability clause if the agency believed that the regulatory program was lawful42
or because the court may feel it easier to partially invalidate a rule that contains
a severability clause. 43
Under current judicial doctrine, the agency receives little payoff for incur-
ring these ex ante and ex post costs. As explained in the previous section,
courts tend not to give substantial deference to severability clauses, preferring
instead to conduct the same severability analysis that they would perform in
the absence of a severability clause. This lack of deference may often be the de-
note 72, at 822; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 48, at 887; Stephenson, supra note 88, at 547-
48; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 225-26 (2006).
142. Applications for FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Re-
quirements and Application of 3o-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Ap-
plications Certifying that a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed, 21
C.F.R. § 314 (2014) ("From the comments we have received to the proposed rule, we believe
there is a possibility that we will be challenged on various portions of the final rule. We ex-
pect we will prevail in any such challenge, as the final rule and each of its provisions is legally sound.
If, however, a court should conclude that any one or more provisions of the final rule is in-
valid, we wish to emphasize our intent that the remaining provisions of the final rule be
permitted to take effect." (emphasis added)).
143. Cf. The Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Chadha and Its Implications for Congressional Over-
sight and Agency Rulemaking: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental
Relations of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 9 8th Cong. 275 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Jo-
seph Moakley) ("[Including severability clauses in legislation] has not been an intelligent
policy [because those clauses] are a dangerously open invitation to the courts to assume
th[e] legislative function."); Kameny, supra note 15, at looi (arguing that some inseverabil-
ity clauses serve "an in terrorem function, as the legislature attempts to guard against judi-
cial review altogether by making the price of invalidation too great").
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cisive factor for an agency considering whether to include a severability clause
in a rule. For example, the National Indian Gaming Commission responded to
a comment requesting that it include a severability clause in one of its rules as
follows:
The Commission . . . addressed [the suggestion that the Commission
include a severability clause in its rule] in the previous preamble, stat-
ing that severability clauses are not conclusive of an agency's intent and
that "the ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the
presence or absence of such a clause."'
Thus, an agency considering whether to include a severability clause in a rule
may conclude that the potential benefits are not worth the candle. The absence
of a deference framework specifically for administrative severability clauses is a
critical feature of a vicious cycle in which courts do not defer to severability
clauses, so agencies do not include them, so courts have no occasion to recon-
sider whether they should defer to them.
Our aim here is not to suggest that agencies should include a severability
clause in every rule. Even if rulemaking were costless, including a severability
clause in a rule would not be advisable under some circumstances. First, sever-
ability is not advisable when the rule's efficacy depends on the interconnected-
ness of its provisions. 4 Second, a severability clause might prove to be mis-
guided if the agency does not know whether it would want a court to sever a
challenged provision.46 Third, there may be some provisions that are severable
and others that are not, and it may be difficult to predict which combinations
should result in severability. Finally, although a regulatory remainder left
standing may be preferable to the court's invalidation of the entire rule, the
144. 25 C.F.R. § 543 (2o14) (citing Canterbury Liquors v. Sullivan, 999 F. Supp. 144 (D. Mass.
1994)).
145. See 50 C.F.R. § 17 (2014) ("We recognize that severability clauses are frequently used in leg-
islation but have decided that such a clause would not be useful in the current rule. The rule
is organized in a manner that reflects the connection among the different paragraphs while
also indicating the distinctiveness of the different provisions. We would expect a court to
take the distinctiveness of the various provisions into consideration during any judicial re-
view of the rule.").
146. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmis-
sion Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Trans-
mitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, 12,281 (1997) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35) ("The Com-
mission will not, at this time, make any determination whether or not [certain regulatory
provisions) are severable .... Circumstances at the time of any court order would dictate
how we should proceed and we would consider all such circumstances, and the entirety of
our policy decisions, before determining how to respond to a court decision.").
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benefits of that regulatory remainder will not always outweigh the drafting
costs of promulgating a severability clause.
Our point here is that the current doctrine on administrative severability
clauses does not give agencies adequate incentives to include these clauses in
their rules even though these clauses can often benefit regulatory schemes more
than agency positions on severability developed in litigation. As we have ex-
plained, even if courts adopt our proposal by developing a deference frame-
work for administrative severability clauses, an agency will sometimes have
good reasons for not including a severability clause in a rule. However, a
framework for severability clauses would ensure that agencies will be compen-
sated for their upfront investment in drafting severability clauses and would
thereby expand an agency's options for creating the best regulatory scheme
with its scarce resources.
III. DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE SEVERABILITY CLAUSES
This Part proposes a deference framework for severability clauses. Before
introducing that framework, we first debunk the primary argument against ju-
dicial deference to administrative severability clauses - namely, that severability
clauses are not the best evidence of the agency's intent regarding severability.
We then explain the framework that courts should follow when reviewing an
administrative severability clause.
A. Disassociating Statutory and Administrative Severability Clauses
Part I demonstrated that regulatory schemes containing severability clauses
would benefit in several important ways if courts deferred to an agency's opin-
ion on the intent and workability questions expressed in a severability clause.
Part II, however, showed that courts tend not to defer to severability clauses.
Rather, courts typically give a rhetorical nod to the existence of a severability
clause but then conduct their own de novo review of agency intent and worka-
bility. This doctrinal treatment of administrative severability clauses is symp-
tomatic of the federal courts' tendency to treat severability analysis in adminis-
trative law as substantially the same as severability analysis for statutes. The
key, then, to understanding why courts hardly defer to administrative severa-
bility clauses is to understand their treatment of statutory severability clauses.
Severability clauses ordinarily state in plain terms that Congress intends for
a court to sever an unconstitutional provision from a statute's remainder. Fed-
eral courts typically regard clear statutory text as strong evidence of Congress's
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intent.'47 Why then do courts look past the plain text of a severability clause to
analyze severability de novo? The accepted explanation is that statutory severa-
bility clauses are boilerplate provisions. 4 We have not seen this argument sys-
tematically developed, but it might proceed in the following way: severability
clauses are not reliable evidence of Congress's intent because they are generally
added to statutes without much (or any) consideration by members of Con-
gress or their staffs. Therefore, a reviewing court is justified in looking past a
severability clause because Congress was likely much more concerned with the
statute's substantive provisions than with the severability clause.
We hear the ring of truth in the claim that Congress is institutionally ill-
equipped to have an informed view of the workability of severability clauses. In
particular, several features of the legislative process in Congress (which we de-
scribe below) justify a court's scrutiny of a statutory severability clause's appar-
ent meaning. If the rulemaking process within the administrative agencies
shared these features, then the parallel treatment of statutory and administra-
tive severability clauses might be justified. However, in several important ways,
the rulemaking process is substantially different from the process of drafting
statutes. Indeed, the reasons for thinking that Congress lacks capacity and in-
centive to consider the severability of statutes are, interestingly, reasons to
147. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012) ("[T]he best evidence of Congress's
intent is the statutory text."); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977
(2o11) ("When a federal law contains an express preemption clause, we focus on the plain
wording of the clause" because it is "the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent.");
West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("The best evidence of
[Congress's] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submit-
ted to the President.").
148. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 463 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (mentioning "a
legitimate severability clause, or some other equally innocuous provision"); Lindenberg v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.R.D. 255, 258 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (describing a severability
clause as "merely boilerplate"); H.R. REP. No. 988-91, at 49 (1970) (describing a severabil-
ity clause as "the usual separability provision in legislation"); 140 CONG. REc. H3117 (daily
ed. May 5, 1994) (statement of Rep. Slaughter) (arguing that floor debate on the inclusion
of a severability clause was unnecessary); 134 CONG. REC. 12,280 (1988) (statement of Rep.
Frank) (describing a severability clause as "just boilerplate severability"); 2 SUTHERLAND
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 5 44.o8 (5 th ed. 1992); 2 NORMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 5 44.8, at 585 (6th ed. 2OO); Israel E. Friedman,
Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 903 (1997) ("In part because severa-
bility clauses have become boilerplate, these clauses have had little effect on courts making
severability determinations."); Kameny, supra note 15, at 1OO5; Max Radin, A Short Way
with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 388, 419 (1942) ("Are we really to imagine that the legislature
had, as it says it has, weighed each paragraph literally and come to the conclusion that it
would have enacted that paragraph if all the rest of the statute were invalid? That contra-
dicts the ordinary experience of which every citizen takes notice."); Stern, supra note 11, at
122; Tribe, supra note 51, at 22 (mentioning "a boilerplate severability clause (of the sort
most laws contain)").
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think that agencies have such capacity and incentive. We consider three such
reasons below.
i. Attention Paid to Severability Clauses
Some commentators have argued that members of Congress and their staff
do not pay much attention to severability clauses. Instead, legislative counsel
throw them "unthinkingly . . . into a statute without considering whether
[they] really want[] each provision of [their] handiwork to stand independent-
ly." 49 Because Congress uses severability clauses so "indiscriminately," a re-
viewing court could reasonably conclude that, if taken literally, severability
clauses would "cover situations which they were never intended to reach."'
The process by which administrative agencies decide to include severability
clauses in rules, however, is vastly different from this supposed congressional
process. Agencies do not just throw severability clauses into their regulations.
As we explained in Part II.B, even the most active user of severability clauses-
the FTC-has included a severability clause in only 6.3% of its rules from 2000
to 2014.' Moreover, unlike Congress, agencies may not include severability
clauses in their rules unthinkingly because the APA's rulemaking procedures
require agencies to respond to public input about their rules. To be sure, con-
gressional committees do hold regular hearings on proposed legislation that
would in theory permit the public to provide input about severability clauses.
Administrative agencies, however, are required to respond in a rational way to
public comments; otherwise, their rules can be set aside as arbitrary and capri-
cious. Moreover, our research suggests that agencies tend to respond with
care to comments suggesting the inclusion or removal of severability clauses.
For example, in response to one set of comments, the Fish and Wildlife Service
explained: "We recognize that severability clauses are frequently used in legis-
lation but have decided that such a clause would not be useful in the current
rule."'' 3 Similarly, in the statement of basis and purpose for one of its rules, the
National Indian Gaming Commission wrote:
149. Nagle, supra note xi, at 239.
1so. Stern, supra note ii, at 124.
151. See supra notes 129-13o and accompanying text.
152. See Reyblatt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("An agency
need not address every comment, but it must respond in a reasoned manner to those that
raise significant problems.").
153. Special Rule for the Polar Bear, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,249, 76,267 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified




[S]ome commenters advocated for the inclusion of a severability clause
.... [T]he Commission declines to include a severability clause in this
regulation because it believes that the regulations are not so intertwined
that striking one provision would necessarily always require invalida-
tion of the entire part, and the lack of a severability clause will not com-
pel a court's finding on the issue.
5 4
In short, there is no evidence that administrative agencies throw severability
clauses unreflectively into their rules.
2. Time Pressure
Even if members of Congress and their staffs were inclined to reflect on the
manifold potential ramifications of a statutory severability clause, they often
lack the time to do so. Congressional staffs work under tremendous time pres-
sure, making it less likely that they will have had the opportunity to consider
the implications of a complex, probabilistic, and procedural instrument like a
severability clause.' 5 Nourse and Schacter's study of legislative drafting in
Congress indirectly supports this hypothesis by finding that:
Several staff members complained about the dangers of drafting bills
on the floor, as this increased the risks of the process becoming "ugly,"
haphazard, and driven by political imperative. Staffers expressed con-
cern about last-minute drafting without a lot of public scrutiny. Specif-
ic fears included provisions being "slipped in," people losing track of
whether one provision squares with another, or a provision being add-
ed to satisfy the needs of a senator in trouble for re-election."s6
Similarly, in Gluck and Bressman's more recent study of congressional legisla-
tive staff, respondents reported that time pressures often made it impossible to
comply with their goal of making the usage of terms consistent across a stat-
ute.5 7 Neither Nourse and Schacter nor Gluck and Bressman surveyed staffers
on their use of severability clauses, but we suspect that time pressures also in-
154. Minimum Internal Control Standards for National Indian Gaming Commission, 77 Fed.
Reg. 58,708, 58,709 (Sept. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 543).
155- Cf Cu~ilar, supra note 66, at 420 n.31 (noting that Congress's ability to control administra-
tive agencies "is almost certainly shaped by the legislature's scarce resources and their com-
peting uses. Legislators must vote on foreign policy, campaign among their constituencies,
evaluate tax law changes, and supervise staff ... [T]hey must develop techniques for de-
ploying scarce attention and resources.").
156. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 140, at 592-93 (footnote omitted).
157. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 140, at 936.
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hibit staffers from meaningfully considering these clauses' potential ramifica-
tions.
It is true that agencies labor under their own time pressures.s s Congress
can impose deadlines on agency action,' s9 the public can petition agencies to
initiate rulemaking,16' and, like Congress, agencies are not immune from the
pressures of election cycles. Still, various statutory and executive controls re-
quire agencies to take care in promulgating rules. As noted, the APA, certain
agency organic acts, and various other statutes impose procedural requirements
on rulemaking that require deliberation and reasoned responses to comments
by a promulgating agency. Review by OIRA typically requires agencies to justi-
fy major proposed rulemakings on the basis of sophisticated economic analysis.
These various procedural mechanisms require an agency to be careful about
each aspect of a proposed rule. 6 ' Indeed, much of the literature on agency ossi-
fication maintains that many of these controls on agency action require agen-
cies to use scarce resources inefficiently in order to explain their reasons for
promulgating rules. 62 We think it is fair to conclude that agencies promulgate
rules in a more deliberate and deliberative way than Congress enacts statutes,
which in part suggests that there should be less concern about deference to
administrative severability clauses than about deference to statutory severabil-
ity clauses.
1S8. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of "Not Now": When Agencies
Defer Decisions, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (2014); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell,
Deadlines in Administrative Law, i56 U. PA. L. REv. 923 (2008).
159. See, e.g., In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (compelling agency
rulemaking in light of "a clear statutory mandate, a deadline nine-years ignored, and an
agency that had admitted its continuing recalcitrance").
16o. See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007).
161. Studies suggest that the average time between several agencies' notices of proposed rule-
making and the promulgation of their final rules is somewhere between one-and-a-half and
five years -far longer than the time between election cycles that Congress has to pass major
legislation. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification's Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA
Rulemakingfrom 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 770 (2008) (finding that, between 2001 and
2005, the EPA took an average of between 1.5 and 2 years to finalize a rule after publishing
it); Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of
Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 134 (1992) (finding that the EPA took an aver-
age time of iio8 days to promulgate a rule); McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 75, at 1388
(noting that "OSHA health standards rarely take less than five years to promulgate").
162. Freeman, supra note 66, at 9; William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals
Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393 (2000); Pierce, supra note 54; Sei-
denfeld, supra note 75, at 514; Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-
Bureaucratic Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEx. L. REV. 559 (1997); Paul






The Nourse-Schacter and Gluck-Bressman surveys have shed light on the
variability, complexity, and polycentricity of statutory drafting in Congress.
Statutes are regularly the result of many legislative bargains and are drafted by
multiple committees over multiple iterations. In their study of staffers on the
Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, Nourse and Schacter found broad
consensus on the proposition that "[t]he [legislative] drafting process . . . is
better understood as multiple drafting processes, varying along many axes,1
63
reinforcing the aphorism that Congress is a "they," not an "it.' 6' Nourse and
Schacter continue:
[R]esponsibility for drafting a bill often is diffused among many people
and groups, chief among them staffers from different offices, Legisla-
tive Counsel drafters, and lobbyists. This dispersal of responsibility
makes it problematic for a court to try to isolate any single moment, ac-
tor, or event that decisively conferred meaning on a contested provi-
sion. 6,
Moreover, respondents in Gluck and Bressman's study emphasized that com-
mittees often operate as drafting "islands," unconnected from the business of
the other committees.
66
The messy reality of the statutory drafting process has several implications
for the plausibility of ascribing to Congress a specific intention to draft and
pass workable severability clauses. First, the committee drafting model creates
incentives for individual members to include severability clauses in statutes;
members want to ensure that the portions of bills they have drafted will remain
in effect even if portions drafted by members of other committees eventually
fail. The larger and more complex a bill, the more likely it contains an uncon-
stitutional provision, and thus the stronger the incentive to include a severabil-
ity clause. The practice of legislating by means of omnibus bills strengthens in-
centives to include severability clauses, but not always in situations in which
they would be advisable. Second, the isolation of congressional committees
suggests that blanket severability clauses may be inserted into portions of bills
drafted by one committee that were not intended to apply to other portions of
the bill. This suggests that a statutory severability clause, drafted and passed by
163. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 140, at 583.
164. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992).
165. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 140, at 618.
166. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 140, at 936.
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a committee without reference to other parts of the bill, does not provide an in-
formed opinion on the larger body's intent or on the workability of the statuto-
ry remainder. Third, traditional forms of democratic accountability likely do
not chasten the temptation to include a far-reaching severability clause in a
statute merely to protect a limited set of provisions. In Congress, responsibility
for a severability clause gone wrong would be diffused across all members, di-
minishing any particular member's concerns that she will be held unaccounta-
ble for inserting an ill-advised severability clause into a statute. This point also
suggests that these clauses do not contain an informed opinion on the statutory
remainder's workability. In short, Congress arguably has too many cooks in
the kitchen for a severability clause meaningfully to reflect the legislative will.
Not so for the administrative agencies. Instead of multiple committees
working in multiple drafting stages, agencies draft rules in a more concerted
fashion. 6' There is no such thing as a "Christmas tree" rule. '68 Rules are typi-
cally drafted by a single team of drafters, representing different offices, whose
draft work product is reviewed multiple times - at least in general terms, if
not word by word - by agency general counsels and often by the agency head
or her deputies. Agency proposed rules are also subject to OIRA review, which
puts them through a rigorous economic analysis. Furthermore, the temptation
to include a severability clause in a rule in the hope of preserving important
substantive provisions is reduced by the fact that responsibility for an unwork-
able regulatory remainder will fall squarely upon the agency (or, more realisti-
cally, the agency head). Thus, administrative severability clauses are more like-
ly than statutory severability clauses to reflect the actual intent of their drafters.
Regardless of the merits of arguments discrediting statutory severability
clauses, the case for not deferring to administrative severability clauses is based
on an inapt analogy between the agencies and Congress. Having made the case
that courts should defer to administrative severability clauses in Part I.B and
having debunked the analogy between legislative and administrative severabil-
ity clauses in this section, we next lay out a deference framework for adminis-
trative severability clauses.
167. The distinction between the drafting methods used in Congress and those used in agencies
might not be as stark in the context of negotiated rulemaking (so-called "neg reg"). Howev-
er, even in the case of negotiated rulemaking, agencies are less likely than Congress to en-
dorse a severability clause that covers aspects of a rule or statute that it was not meant to
cover.
168. Cf. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing "Christmas tree" bills).
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B. A Chevron-Style Framework for Severability Clauses
We propose a two-step deference framework for administrative severability
clauses, similar in some respects to Chevron deference. The Chevron framework
addresses how a federal court should treat an agency's interpretation of a feder-
al statute that it administers. The framework proceeds in two steps. At Step
One, the court asks whether "the intent of Congress is clear" after employing
traditional canons of statutory construction; if so, "that is the end of the mat-
ter ... the court... must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. " 169 Step One launches a purely legal inquiry. Employing interpretive
techniques in which they are skilled, courts ask whether the agency has stepped
beyond the boundaries of its statutory authority. If, after employing these
techniques, a reviewing court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous
on the relevant issue, then the court proceeds to Step Two. At Step Two, the
court again undertakes a purely legal inquiry and asks whether the agency's in-
terpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." 170 If so,
then the court defers to the agency's interpretation because "a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of an agency." 171
Chevron acknowledges that within a certain "zone of reasonableness" 7 '
statutory interpretation is closer to creating policy than it is to discerning legal
norms, and that it is better to allow the more expert and accountable agency to
create policy. As the Supreme Court explained in 2005:
In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in statutes within an agen-
cy's jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency
to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps, the
Court explained, involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better
equipped to make than courts. If a statute is ambiguous, and if the imple-
menting agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal
court to accept the agency's construction of the statute, even if the
agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best statuto-
ry interpretation. 3
169. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
170. Id. at 843.
171. Id. at 844.
172. RicHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 86-87 (2008) (explaining the meaning of the
phrase "zone of reasonableness").
173. Nat'l Cable & Telecom. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (empha-
sis added).
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Thus, both courts and agencies have roles to play under Chevron -roles delim-
ited by their institutional capacities. Using traditional interpretation methods,
courts police the clear statutory boundaries, while agencies, employing their
own expertise, may create reasonable policies within those boundaries.
The deference framework for administrative severability clauses that we
propose is similar. At Step One, a reviewing court should determine whether
the regulatory remainder is lawful. Michael Dorf has called this the "taint prob-
lem" for severability analysis because the remainder of a statute or rule may be
"tainted" by residual legal defects when a court invalidates a certain provi-
sion.74 This inquiry is analytically prior to the two questions of the Alaska Air-
lines severability test.
If the remainder is lawful, then at Step Two a court should determine what
the severability clause requires and defer to it. Like Chevron Step Two, the
courts' review at this stage should be highly deferential because, as we ex-
plained in Part I.B, agencies are better than courts at determining when a regu-
latory remainder will be workable.' 5 Like Chevron, our deference framework
assigns to the courts and agencies roles delimited by each institution's capaci-
ties.
The deference framework we propose would break the vicious cycle in
which courts, rather than agencies, make the severability decision. By giving
agencies deference at Step Two, it would (1) allow agencies to answer the in-
tent and workability questions and (2) provide agencies with incentives to in-
clude severability clauses in more rules when appropriate.
Before expounding further upon the mechanics of our proposed deference
framework, we should note that administrative law already has the conceptual
resources to implement the framework. Under the Seminole Rock doctrine, 76
which predates Chevron by nearly forty years, federal courts give what is essen-
174. Dorf, supra note 15, at 307, 310.
175. With one potential exception, the Supreme Court has never invalidated an agency's con-
struction of a statute at Chevron Step Two. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at
the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, iO9 YALE L.J. 1399, 1399-
1400 & n.5 (2000) (citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 734-36 (1999), as
a potential exception). Lower federal courts have behaved similarly, though, as expected,
there have been more decisions decided against the agency at Step Two than there have been
in the Supreme Court. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30-31 (1998) (noting
that, in the years 1995 and 1996, U.S. courts of appeals upheld agency interpretations at
Step Two in one hundred cases and rejected them in twelve).
176. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) ("[T]he ultimate criterion
[in interpreting a regulation] is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of control-
ling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."); see also Auer
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (providing the modern formulation of the doctrine).
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tially Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of its own rules." Like
Chevron, the contemporary statement of the Seminole Rock doctrine involves a
two-step analysis. First, a reviewing court asks whether the agency's interpreta-
tion steps outside the boundaries established by the agency's original rule -
that is, whether the agency's interpretation is "inconsistent" with the regula-
tion., 8 If not, the court asks whether the agency's interpretation is "plainly er-
roneous." 79
Two rationales support the doctrine. First, an originalist rationale 8 , posits
that agencies, as the drafters of administrative rules, have special insight into
their intent when promulgating those rules.1 Second, a functionalist rationale
emphasizes the agencies' specialized expertise in administering their "'complex
and highly technical regulatory program[s]. ' ' x82
Seminole Rock is related to severability because questions of severability are
fundamentally questions of interpretation.' Just as archetypal questions of
statutory interpretation oblige the court to examine the legislative authorities
(for example, text, structure, and legislative history) to determine the legisla-
ture's intent, so too does severability analysis oblige the court to examine the
regulation in search of the agency's intent. If severability is fundamentally a
question of interpretation, then an agency's opinion on the severability of its
rule is an interpretation of that rule deserving Seminole Rock deference. Small
wonder, then, that the rationales underlying the Seminole Rock doctrine dove-
tail with the two questions of the Alaska Airlines test. The "touchstone" of sev-
erability analysis is the lawmakers' intent. And since agencies have special in-
sight into their intent when enacting administrative rules, they are best
177. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
178. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
359 (1989)).
179. Id.
18o. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 47, at 1454.
181. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991);
Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III, 464 F.3 d 202, 2o8 (2d Cir. 2oo6); Manning, supra
note 52, at 630-31; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 47, at 1454.
182. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy
Mines, Inc., 5oi U.S. 68o, 697 (1991)); see also Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 117
F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cit. 1997) (according deference "because the Commission has greater
technical expertise in this field than does the Court"); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note
47, at 1456.
183. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 289
(1994); Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Chal-
lenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REv. 1735, 1752 (2006); Metzger,
supra note 1o9, at 928; Nagle, supra note 11, at 232-33; Stern, supra note ii, at 115.
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equipped to opine on that intent. Further, severability analysis requires a de-
termination of whether the remainder of a regulation is workable. Since agen-
cies have special expertise in the "complex and highly technical regulatory pro-
gram[s]" they administer, they are best equipped to opine on the workability
of regulatory remainders. 84 Thus, although neither the Supreme Court nor the
D.C. Circuit have applied the Seminole Rock doctrine to administrative severa-
bility clauses, accommodating the deference framework we propose would not
require a seismic shift in the current doctrine. We now discuss each step of our
proposed deference framework in more detail.
1. Step One: Address Legal Defects
At Severability Step One, a reviewing court must determine whether the
regulatory remainder is lawful or "tainted" by residual legal defects.' s The
Alaska Airlines severability test does not require this inquiry, largely because the
Alaska Airlines test assumes that the reviewing court will not leave in place a re-
mainder that is unlawful. In any case, a reviewing court has a duty to deter-
mine whether the regulatory remainder is lawful.
The proper scope of a court's review for residual legal defects will inherent-
ly be somewhat open-ended. On one hand, a court may not leave in place legal
defects that are apparent from its review of the provision challenged in litiga-
tion. On the other hand, the duty to determine the existence of residual defects
does not require the court to comb the entire rule in search of problems. In-
deed, such a requirement would, in some cases, be far too onerous for a court
to perform and would arguably violate the Constitution's case-or-controversy
jurisdictional requirement by giving a court license to rule on the legality of any
aspect of a rule, even if not challenged by the parties. 6 Thus, a reviewing
court is obliged to determine whether the remainder contains residual legal de-
fects that are substantially related to the challenged provision. We now explain
how a court should undertake that task.
184. It may seem awkward to think of clauses contained in rules as interpretations of those same
rules. But upon reflection, there is nothing mysterious about parts of a text explaining how
to interpret other parts of a text. The definitions at the beginning of almost every federal
statute, for example, do just that. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2085, 2104 (2002). Of course, interpretive clauses will them-
selves require interpretation, but this form of regress is entirely benign; nothing sets it apart
from any other piece of ordinary language. Any interpretation of ordinary language will it-
self require an interpretation, which will in turn require an interpretation, and so on. See
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, no
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1369-70 (1997).
185. Dorf, supra note 15, at 310-26.




A reviewing court considering whether to leave a regulatory remainder in
place must determine whether the remainder suffers from any of several types
of legal defects, including whether the remainder is unconstitutional, ultra vir-
es, or arbitrary and capricious. 1
7
First, a regulatory remainder may be unconstitutional. Suppose the De-
partment of Homeland Security promulgates a rule containing a severability
clause and two substantive provisions: first, the rule bans all "First Amend-
ment activities" in domestic commercial airports, and second, the rule contains
a fallback provision stating that, "In the event that a court sets this rule aside,
all expressive activities that, consistent with the First Amendment, can be
banned in an airport, shall be banned."'' 8 8 If a plaintiff challenges the first pro-
vision in court, the remainder clearly would contain a residual constitutional
defect. While the reviewing court would set the first provision aside as uncon-
stitutionally overbroad,'8s the remainder would be unconstitutionally vague.' 90
Second, a regulatory remainder may also be ultra vires, even if the original
rule was not. Suppose a federal statute directs the Federal Reserve Board to
promulgate two types of regulations.' 9 ' First, the Board must establish proce-
dures to be used in an administrative hearing to determine whether a particular
financial institution that does not fall under the statutory definition of a "bank"
nevertheless offers many of the services that banks offer (banking services). Se-
cond, after those procedures are established, the Board must promulgate regu-
lations to monitor and control the activities of institutions found to offer bank-
ing services to ensure that consumers are adequately protected. Now suppose
the Board promulgates a rule that establishes both the procedures to be used in
hearings and the substantive regulations governing institutions that offer
banking services. Finally, suppose the hearing procedures are unconstitutional.
In this example, if a plaintiff successfully challenges the hearing procedures,
487. We considered whether a court's ground for invalidating a regulatory provision should af-
fect the degree of deference that the court gives to a severability clause, but we concluded
that it should not. Regulatory provisions are either valid or invalid. If they are valid, they
remain valid irrespective of the type of legal defect from which juxtaposed regulatory provi-
sions might suffer.
188. This illustration is based on an example offered by Doff, supra note 15, at 312. Doffs exam-
ple itself is based on Board ofAirport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 570-71
(1987).
189. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 570-71.
19o. Doff, supra note 15, at 312.
191. The following example is loosely based on Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v.
Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
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the regulatory remainder would suffer from a residual ultra vires defect because
the statute directs the Board to promulgate substantive regulations only after
promulgating procedures to be used in hearings.
Finally, the regulatory remainder might be legally defective because it is ar-
bitrary and capricious. This defect is most common when a reviewing court
renders the remainder inconsistent with the rule's statement of basis and pur-
pose. 192 To illustrate, consider the D.C. Circuit's decision in MD/DCDE
Broadcasters Association 1.193 In MD/DC/DE Broadcasters I, the court considered
the constitutionality of an FCC rule regarding the equal employment oppor-
tunity policies of broadcasters. 9 4 To ensure that minority and women candi-
dates knew about available job opportunities with broadcast stations, the FCC
rule required broadcasters that sought licenses from the FCC to make "a good
faith effort to disseminate widely any information about job openings." 95 To
"afford[] broadcasters flexibility in designing their EEO programs," the rule
allowed broadcasters to select one of two options for accomplishing that
goal."96 Under Option A, licensees had to "undertake four approved recruit-
ment initiatives in each two-year period."' 97 The FCC did not require licensees
who selected Option A to report the race and gender of job applicants. 9s Un-
der Option B, licensees could design their own outreach programs but had to
report the race and gender of each job applicant and how the applicant was re-
ferred to the station. 99 The D.C. Circuit held that Option B required race-
based discrimination and was accordingly subject to strict scrutiny."° ° The
court then held that Option B was unconstitutional because it was not narrow-
ly tailored to any ostensibly compelling interest that the Commission might
192. For the purpose of determining whether a rule is arbitrary and capricious, courts are obliged
to consider an agency's reasoning only at the time the agency made its decision. See SEC v.
Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943).
193. MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC (MD/DC/DE Broadcasters I1), 253 F.3d 732 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
194. MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC (MD/DC/DE Broadcasters 1), 236 F.3d 13, 16 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
195. Id. at 17 (citing Review of the Commission's Broadcast Equal Employment Opportunity
Rules and Policies, 15 FCC Rec. 2329, 2364 (2000)).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.2o8o(d) (2014)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 20-21.
12422286 2015
ADMINISTRATIVE SEVERABILITY CLAUSES
have had."° Finally, the court found that the unconstitutional provision was
inseverable from the remainder of the rule and set aside the entire rule." 2
In its petition for rehearing in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Association II, the
FCC asked the court to reinstate the remainder of its rule.2"3 Writing for the
court, Judge Douglas Ginsburg observed that the FCC had two goals in prom-
ulgating the rule, but that Options A and B would each achieve only one of
those goals." 4 As the court observed, the FCC's statement of basis and purpose
stated "that Option A could satisfy the goal of achieving broad outreach" and
"that Option B was added in order to afford broadcasters flexibility. " °cs The
court accordingly concluded that severing the invalid part of the rule "would
leave in force a rule that, in view of the Commission's own stated goals, would
be arbitrary and capricious ",, 6 because the remainder would achieve only one of
the stated goals. The majority plainly thought they had confronted a taint
problem. After setting aside the unconstitutional part of the FCC's rule, the
rule's remainder became, in the majority's view, arbitrary and capricious. Thus,
the court set aside the entire rule.
In dissent, Judge David Tatel criticized the majority for not deferring to the
agency's litigation position. He maintained that the court should defer to the
agency's opinion on severability because the agency had the statutory authority
to promulgate Option A and expressed its position in the briefs that Option B
was severable.2 °7 Regardless of whether the regulatory remainder was arbitrary
and capricious under the case's facts, we agree with the majority's endorsement
of the following principle: a court may not leave in place a regulatory remain-
der that is inadequately supported by the original rule's statement of basis and
purpose.28 While courts should defer to an agency's opinion whether a rule's
remainder will be workable (a claim we defended in Part I), courts should not
defer to the agency's position on whether the rule's statement of basis and pur-
pose adequately supports the remainder. An agency's statement of basis and
2o. Id. at 21-22.
202. Id. at 22-23.
203. MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC (MDiDC/DE Broadcasters II), 253 F.3d 732, 736
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
2o4. Id.
zos. Id. at 735.
2o6. Id. at 736.
207. Id. at 739-41. On this point, the dissent may have had the better argument. The majority ob-
served that in promulgating the rule, the Commission had two goals: broad outreach and
flexibility. See id. at 735. But as the dissent noted, the remainder of the rule -that is, Option
A-itself gave the broadcasters a great deal of flexibility because the broadcasters could
choose between thirteen different programs under Option A. See id. at 741.
208. See5 U.S.C. S 7o6(2)(A) (2012).
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purpose need not persuade the reviewing court that the regulatory remainder is
a good idea; indeed, from the court's perspective the remainder may seem like
a disaster. However, for the court to satisfy its obligations under the APA, it
must be persuaded that the regulatory remainder has adequate support in the
agency's statement of basis and purpose -that is, that the agency has provided
reasons for the regulatory provisions that remain.
Residual arbitrary and capricious review accommodates the sensible idea
that the larger the portion of an administrative rule that a court invalidates, the
less willing a court should be to enforce the remainder. Generally speaking, for
example, the larger the portion of a rule that a court invalidates, the more likely
that the remainder will also be set aside because it is more likely to be arbitrary
and capricious under the rule's statement of basis and purpose. We do not ad-
vocate that courts use the extent of invalidation as a factor when determining
whether to sever invalid provisions of rules, but the extent of invalidation may
be helpful in predicting what a court will do with a regulatory remainder.
b. Remedying Defects
When a reviewing court identifies residual legal defects in a rule containing
a severability clause, it should first determine whether it could invalidate the
remaining infirmities without causing additional taint problems. If invalidating
additional provisions would remove the residual defects, then the court should
generally use its equitable discretion to invalidate those additional provisions
and uphold the remainder.
But if the court cannot eventually rid the remainder of taint problems, then
the remedy should depend on the type of legal defect tainting the remainder.
Consider the three types of legal defects discussed above. Neither courts nor
agencies can fix rules that are ultra vires or constitutional. In our hypothetical
example of the Federal Reserve Board's banking regulations, neither the re-
viewing court nor the Board can change the fact that the remainder of the
Board's rule is ultra vires in the absence of pre-established administrative pro-
cedures for determining whether a financial institution offers banking services.
The same is true for constitutional violations. Thus, if a rule inextricably vio-
lates an agency's congressional mandate or the Constitution, the court should
invalidate the entire rule.
By contrast, courts should often use the remand-without-vacatur remedy
when a court finds a regulatory remainder to be arbitrary or capricious. Ordi-




lifies the action and requires the agency to initiate new procedures. 9 Courts
sometimes, however, remand the rule without vacating it,' which leaves a
rule in force while the agency works to cure its defects." Remand without va-
catur eliminates some of the costs of the remand-and-repromulgation cycle be-
cause regulated entities do not have to adjust to a regulatory vacuum during
the time that the agency works to fix its original rule's defects. Of course, if the
agency does not eventually revise a remanded rule to the court's satisfaction,
then the court will vacate the rule in its entirety. But while the rule is on re-
mand, regulated entities must still comply with the regulatory remainder.' 2
Remand without vacatur will often be the appropriate remedy for a rule
containing a severability clause whose remainder is arbitrary or capricious.
Courts have typically used remand without vacatur in two sets of circumstanc-
es: where the court determines (1) that the agency can likely cure a rule's de-
fects and (2) that vacatur would have disruptive consequences for a regulatory
regime. 3 With respect to the first circumstance, the promulgating agency can
aog. See Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F. 3 d 452, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Silberman, J., concurring) ("[Va-
catur] requir[es] the agency to initiate another rulemaking proceeding if it would seek to
confront the problem anew." (citation omitted)).
210. See Stephanie J. Tatham, The Unusual Remedy of Remand Without Vacatur,
ADMIN. CONF. U.S. 54-58 (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/Remand%2oWithout%2oVacatur%2oFinal%2oReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y778-TY99]
(collecting seventy-three cases employing remand without vacatur between 1972 and 2013).
zii. Remand without vacatur is somewhat controversial in the D.C. Circuit. The Circuit seemed
firmly to approve the practice in Checkosky, 23 F. 3d at 465, but members of the court contin-
ue to claim that it is illegal. See, e.g., Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 31o F.3d 747, 758 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("Although I greatly respect the majority's attempt to
save a well-intended relief program from possibly inefficient further proceedings, I do not
think we can lawfully do so."); Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 490-91 (Randolph, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that remand without vacatur is prohibited by § 706(2) (A) of the APA, which provides
that a reviewing court "shall" set aside unlawful agency action). See generally Levin, supra
note 16, at 361 (arguing that remand without vacatur strikes a balance between agency dis-
cretion and judicial activism); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gifi Horses and Great Expectations:
Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARiz. ST. L.J. 599, 6ol (2004) (arguing
that courts should use remand without vacatur only sparingly because the remedy encour-
ages courts to exercise sweeping review of agency actions). The Administrative Conference
of the United States has approved remand without vacatur as a legitimate remedy under 5
U.S.C. § 7o6(2), and has recommended that courts consider the remedy as an alternative to
vacatur. See Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013-6: Remand Without Vaca-
tur, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/Remand%2oWithout%2oVacatur%zo_%2oFinal%2oRecommendation.pdf [https ://perma
.cc/7BBM-MDBF].
212. Tatham, supra note 210, at i.
213. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146, 151-52 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Levin, supra note 16, at 380.
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usually fix a regulatory remainder containing a severability clause that a court
finds arbitrary and capricious by providing additional reasons for the remain-
der in the rule's statement of basis and purpose. With respect to the second cir-
cumstance, because agencies do not frequently include severability clauses in
their rules, when an agency does so, this provides strong circumstantial evi-
dence that the agency believes that vacatur would have disruptive consequences
for its regulatory scheme.
One D.C. Circuit opinion has already suggested this approach to severabil-
ity. In Alliance for Community Media, a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that FCC
regulations authorizing cable providers to ban indecent material on cable access
channels violated the First Amendment. 14 Consequently, the court had to de-
termine whether to sever the unconstitutional provisions of the FCC's rule
from the regulatory remainder. The court observed that, were it to sever the
invalid provisions, it would leave in place a regulatory scheme under which in-
decent material could be regulated only on cable channels for unaffiliated
commercial programmers but not on cable channels set aside for public, educa-
tional, or governmental use."' The FCC, however, had not provided a justifica-
tion for this seemingly odd distinction between cable access channels. Accord-
ingly, the court was concerned that leaving this scheme in place would be
arbitrary and capricious. Rather than invalidate the entire rule, the court re-
manded it without vacatur 6 The court explained:
(W]here an agency is involved, a court need not strike down a regula-
tion to effect a reconsideration by the issuing body. Thus, a court will
issue a remand to the issuing agency if there is "substantial doubt" as to
whether the agency intended its regulation to be severable. Such a re-
mand is often in the best interest of justice in that it allows the agency
to reconsider the residue of its original regulation and keeps judges out
of the business of administrators.217
However, Alliance for Community Media was later vacated,"' and no subse-
quent cases have followed its approach of ordering remand without vacatur in
these circumstances. We agree, however, with Alliance's approach.
214. Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, lo F.3d 812, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 831.
217. Alliance for Cmry. Media, io F.3 d at 830 (citation omitted).
218. See Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 15 F. 3 d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (granting rehearing en
banc and vacating lo F.3d 812); Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1O5 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (determining en banc that the FCC regulations were constitutional and thus did not




The foregoing discussion explains how courts should proceed at Severabil-
ity Step One. A court should determine (i) whether invalidating a portion of a
rule creates residual legal defects for the regulatory remainder that are substan-
tially related to the challenged provision and (2) whether these defects can be
removed. If the defects are inextricable, then the appropriate remedy will de-
pend on the nature of the defect. When the defect is constitutional or ultra vir-
es in nature, the court should set aside the entire rule. But when an inextricable
defect renders the rule arbitrary and capricious, the court should generally re-
mand the rule without vacating it. If, on the other hand, the regulatory re-
mainder does not contain inextricable legal defects, the reviewing court should
proceed to Severability Step Two, to which we now turn.
2. Step Two: Defer to the Agency
Part I.B showed that if courts deferred to administrative severability claus-
es, then regulatory schemes would promote expertise, accountability, the rule
of law, and efficiency. In light of these potential benefits, we maintain that a
court's review at Severability Step Two should be highly deferential and rela-
tively straightforward: determine what the severability clause requires and fol-
low it.
This thesis requires a defense, of course. The fact that agency decision mak-
ing on severability is typically better than judicial decision making does not
necessarily entail that a reviewing court should always defer to an administra-
tive severability clause. A reviewing court's severability decision might be more
prudent in some cases if it could draw upon an agency's technical expertise. But
not every severability decision will be highly technical. Similarly, the promulga-
tion of some administrative severability clauses may not have involved partici-
pation by the public and may not have engendered any great reliance interests.
This might lead some to conclude that the deference framework we propose is
over-inclusive. One might argue that the fact that agencies are often superior
decision makers about severability supports a deference framework more akin
to the Skidmore regime, according to which the degree of deference that a sev-
erability clause receives should vary with a rule's technical complexity; the ex-
tent to which the agency's expertise and democratic accountability informed its
adoption of the severability clause; and the extent to which the public has re-
lied on the severability clause. 9
219. Cf. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 47, at 1458 (making a similar point about the domain
of Seminole Rock deference).
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We must therefore defend our choice of a more rule-like framework over a
standard-like framework." ° An extensive literature addresses the considera-
tions that should lead one to favor (or not favor) a rule over a standard. 1 The
primary drawback of rules is that they are usually over- or under-inclusive with
respect to the rulemaker's underlying policy goals.' A rule-like framework
may therefore lead a court to defer to an administrative severability clause that
does not confer the benefits of administrative severability clauses discussed in
Part I.B.
We believe, however, that rules have benefits that outweigh their draw-
backs (vis-A-vis standards) in the case of deference to administrative severabil-
ity clauses. First, a rule-like framework would better confine the discretion of
lower courts, helping courts higher in the judicial hierarchy overcome princi-
pal-agent problems.' 3 A standard-like framework may influence lower courts
to defer to administrative severability clauses not when those clauses, say, re-
flect the agency's administrative expertise, but when the court approves of the
regulatory scheme that would result from the rule's remainder. Adopting a
rule-like framework would help to curb this shirking tendency.
220. Kathleen Sullivan explains the choice between rules and standards:
A legal directive is "rule"-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a de-
terminate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts .... A rule captures the
background principle or policy in a form that from then on operates independent-
ly.... [T]he rule's force as a rule is that decisionmakers follow it, even when di-
rect application of the background principle or policy to the facts would produce a
different result .... A legal directive is "standard"-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or
policy to a fact situation. Standards ... giv[e] the decisionmaker more discretion
than do rules. Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant
factors or the totality of the circumstances.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, io6 HARv. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992).
221. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 135-67 (1991); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1994); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B.
Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23
(2000).
222. See MARK KELMAN, A GUDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 40-41 (1987); SCHAUER, supra note
221, at 31-34; Korobkin, supra note 221, at 36-37; Merrill, supra note 72, at 826; Sullivan, su-
pra note 220, at 58.
223. See Korobkin, supra note 221, at 38-39; Merrill, supra note 72, at 820-21; Vermeule, supra
note 78, at 355.
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Second, a rule-like framework would be more predictable and thus would
encourage the development of investment-backed expectations.' As discussed
in Part I.B.3, predictability in the law has a number of cost-saving advantages
for agencies and regulated entities alike. Because agencies can better predict the
effect of a severability clause, they can choose how to use their rulemaking re-
sources most efficiently. If an agency is relatively certain that a court will defer
to a severability clause, for example, it may choose to promulgate a set of sub-
stantive regulations as a single rule rather than divide the regulations across
several rules. The agency might also devote fewer agency resources to explain-
ing how the agency's administrative expertise informs the adoption of the sev-
erability clause. Similarly, regulated entities would be better positioned to or-
ganize their affairs around a regulatory scheme because they could more easily
predict what the law would be if a challenged provision were eventually set
aside. " Finally, both agencies and regulated entities can save costs associated
with the additional expense of litigating the application of a standard as op-
posed to the application of a rule. 6
We also doubt that the over-inclusiveness problem is very severe in the case
of a rule-like deference framework for severability clauses. As we explained in
Part III.A, agencies tend not to include severability clauses in their rules lightly.
When they do include a severability clause, they do so only after deliberation.
Moreover, the cost of including a severability clause in a rule, as opposed to
opining on severability in litigation, suggests that agencies will include these
clauses prudently when they elect to bear these comparatively higher costs.
If one accepts our defense of Chevron-style deference to administrative sev-
erability clauses, one might then ask why our proposal is even more deferential
than Chevron. At Chevron Step Two, courts defer only to reasonable agency in-
terpretations of ambiguous federal statutes. Why then do we not propose that
courts defer only to reasonable administrative severability clauses?
Deference only to putatively reasonable administrative severability clauses,
however, would invite courts to determine for themselves whether a regulatory
remainder is workable, thereby defeating the very purpose of the deference
framework. At Chevron Step Two, the question of reasonableness is a question
of legal meaning-that is, whether the agency has adopted a permissible con-
struction of the statutory text (interpreted in light of the traditional tools of
224. See SCHAUER, supra note 221, at 137-45; Merrill, supra note 72, at 822-23; Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590-92 (1988); Vermeule, su-
pra note 78, at 356.
225. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
226. See SCHAUER, supra note 221, at 145-49; Merrill, supra note 72, at 825; Vermeule, supra note
78, at 356.
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statutory construction). That question of reasonableness is still one within the
institutional competence of the courts and does not require the reviewing court
to evaluate the validity of the agency's underlying reasons for adopting its con-
struction. By contrast, the question of reasonableness at Severability Step Two
would require the reviewing court to determine whether it is permissible for
the agency to maintain that the regulatory remainder is workable. This reason-
ableness question would inherently take the reviewing court outside of its insti-
tutional competence and collapse into an evaluation of the substantive regula-
tory merits of the agency's decision.
Furthermore, concerns about the unreasonableness of a severability clause
are mostly allayed by our proposed residual arbitrary and capricious review,
which we outlined in the previous section. If the regulatory remainder lacks a
legal defect, such as being ultra vires or inconsistent with the agency's state-
ment of basis and purpose, then the severability clause will likely not be unrea-
sonable. Accordingly, the deference framework we propose can afford to be
even more deferential than Chevron at Step Two without allowing unreasona-
ble severability clauses to escape scrutiny.
3. Step Zero: The Limits of the Deference Framework
An agency may express its opinion on severability through agency actions
other than including a severability clause in a rule. As we noted in Part II.B, or-
dinary agency practice is to opine on severability in trial and appellate briefs.
An agency could also opine on severability by issuing any of a variety of infor-
mal agency documents, including interpretative rules and guidance manuals,
which do not require notice and comment.7' We should therefore defend an
underlying assumption of this Article -the assumption that the "domain""' of
a deference framework for severability should be limited to severability clauses.
Put differently, we assume that courts should not give Chevron-style deference
to other forms of agency action in which an agency might opine on severability.
Several Supreme Court cases might suggest that our deference regime
should cast a wider net. The Supreme Court has addressed another "domain"
question in the context of determining what agency actions should receive
Chevron deference.' 9 In the leading case, United States v. Mead Corp., the Court
227. 5 U.S.C. 5 553(b)(A) (2012).
228. See generally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 48.
229. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001) (holding that some agency statutory interpretations-particularly those contained in
interpretive rules, informal orders, or other pronouncements issued without extensive pro-
cedures- are presumptively not entitled to Chevron deference); Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,
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considered whether tariff classification rulings by the Customs Service were
entitled to Chevron deference.23 The Court held that the tariff classification
rulings at issue should not receive Chevron deference because they were not
promulgated in the exercise of delegated authority to make rules with the force
of law. The Court stated that notice-and-comment rulemaking (and formal ad-
judication) would presumptively receive Chevron deference but that other
agency actions might also qualify for deference when "it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority."2"' Thus, Mead expressly declined sharply to delimit
Chevron's domain to legislative rules.23
The Supreme Court's Seminole Rock doctrine requires deference to an even
larger set of agency actions. Auer itself, for example, involved an agency inter-
pretation expressed in an amicus brief2 33 In MD/DCiDE Broadcasters 11, three
judges on the D.C. Circuit suggested that Seminole Rock/Auer deference should
apply to agency opinions on severability expressed in litigation. In that case,
Judge David Tatel dissented from the D.C. Circuit's denial of rehearing en
banc, in an opinion joined by then-Chief Judge Harry Edwards and Judge Ju-
dith Rogers. The FCC petitioned for rehearing, requesting that the court rein-
state the remainder of a rule. Judge Tatel argued that the agency's opinion on
the severability of its rule was an interpretation of the rule warranting Seminole
Rock deference. 34 Thus, if judicial deference to an agency's opinion on severa-
bility follows as a direct application of the Seminole Rock doctrine - that is, if
courts should defer to administrative severability clauses pursuant to Seminole
Rock - then perhaps the domain of our proposed deference framework should
not be limited to severability clauses.
Although we agree that administrative severability clauses warrant defer-
ence under the Seminole Rock doctrine, we do not think that courts should give
Chevron-style deference to agency opinions on severability other than severabil-
ity clauses.3 In large part, our view is based on misgivings we share with sev-
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that agencies' interpretations of statutes contained in
opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines are not enti-
tled to Chevron deference).
230. Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
231. Id. at 226-27 (emphasis added).
232. Merrill, supra note 72, at 819-20.
233. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
234. MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC (MD/DC/DE Broadcasters II), 253 F. 3d 732, 740
(2001) (citing Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
235. Several scholars have expressed a similar view in the context of determining Chevron's do-
main. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidance Manuals and the
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eral Justices on the Supreme Court about Seminole Rock itself.23 6 Recently, sev-
eral Justices have criticized the Seminole Rock doctrine's tendency to encourage
agencies to issue vague rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking and
then clarify those rules through less formal, deliberative, and participatory pro-
cedures.237 Some Justices worry that the Seminole Rock doctrine creates incen-
tives that ultimately undermine the accountability, transparency, and predicta-
bility of administrative rulemaking3 8
There are similar concerns about incentives related to informal agency
opinions on severability. Part II.B noted that the current severability doctrine
does not create adequate incentives for agencies to promulgate severability
clauses through notice-and-comment procedures. So giving the same Chevron-
style deference to agency opinions on severability expressed through informal
agency actions would seem to undermine an agency's incentive to use more
formal procedures.39
Chevron-style deference for informal agency opinions on severability would
also generate uncertainty. A reviewing court cannot, as a practical matter, give
Chevron-style deference to every agency informal opinion on severability be-
cause agency officials may express inconsistent opinions. Accordingly, a defer-
ence framework that would give Chevron-style deference to some informal
Like -Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311 (1992); Robert
A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 1 (199o); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1443 (2005); Eskridge, supra note 39, at 428; Merrill, supra note 72, at
831; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 48, at 835.
236. Several current Justices have expressed doubts about the Seminole Rock doctrine. See Decker
v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012)
(majority opinion by Justice Alito, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas joined); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thom-
as, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Ginsburg) (citing Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501
U.S. 68o, 696 (1991)). In light of these criticisms, Court observers have wondered whether
"a reconsideration of Auer is in the offing." Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Deference Still Upfor
Grabs?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 18, 2012, 11:36 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2o12
/o6/18/auer-deference-still-up-for-grabs [http://perma.cc/J9-ULS6].
237. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Au-
er deference encourages agencies to be vague in framing regulations, with the plan of issuing
'interpretations' to create the intended new law without observance of notice and comment
procedures." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
238. Id.
239. Cf. Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They just Don't Get It, 1O
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 12 (1996) (noting that deference "generates incentives to be vague in
framing regulations, with the plan of. . . creat[ing] the intended new law without ob-




agency actions would have to apply a meta-standard for determining which
agency actions warrant deference. 4° Such a meta-standard, however, would
likely produce inefficient litigation over the proper application of the standard
in individual cases. Chevron-style deference for agency opinions on severability
should therefore be reserved for severability clauses.
Reserving Chevron-style deference for severability clauses does not mean,
however, that a reviewing court should give no deference to an agency's opin-
ion on severability expressed in an informal agency action. We think informal
agency opinions on severability should receive Skidmore deference. 4' When no-
tice-and-comment procedures are prohibitively time- and resource-consuming,
informal agency opinions on severability can generate some of a severability
clause's benefits. For example, even if a court does not defer to an agency's in-
formal opinion on severability and strikes down a rule entirely, an informal
opinion on severability could promote predictability because it could indicate
how the agency is likely to proceed in the future. Suppose, for example, that an
agency promulgates provisions A and B as part of regulation R and states in an
informal agency opinion that provisions A and B are severable. Assume further
that a court later rules that provision A is unlawful and inseverable from provi-
sion B. In this case, though the agency's opinion was ineffective at preventing a
court from striking down the rule, the opinion would still give regulated enti-
ties some evidence that the agency is likely, in the future, to re-promulgate
provision B even in the absence of provision A.
Furthermore, since agencies do not use severability clauses frequently, 1 2
agencies will likely clarify the severability of current regulations, if at all,
through informal agency actions. Although we prefer that agencies opine on
severability using severability clauses, amending existing rules that would ben-
efit from an agency opinion on severability may be too cumbersome or cost-
ly.'43 In these circumstances, we think an agency should be given incentives to
opine on the severability of its rules, even if the agency does not express its
opinion through a formal amendment to a rule. Accordingly, we think Skid-
more deference is appropriate to encourage an agency to clarify its position on
severability rather than remain silent.
240. For more on meta-standards, see generally Merrill, supra note 72.
241. For a thorough analysis of the Skidmore doctrine, see Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Concep-
tualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1112-28
(2001).
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. Cf Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[U]nless a statute or
regulation is of crystalline transparency, the agency... cannot avoid interpreting it, and...
would be stymied in its enforcement duties if every time it brought a case... it had to pause
for a bout, possibly lasting several years, of notice and comment rulemaking.").
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Under this approach, the various tiers of deference would appropriately
match the diligence the agency used in expressing its opinion on severability. A
reviewing court would reward an agency for an informal opinion on severabil-
ity with deference tailored to the degree of care and expertise that the agency
employed in adopting that opinion. Further, if an agency chose to invest even
greater resources by promulgating a severability clause through the rigors of
notice and comment, then a reviewing court would give additional deference in
recognition of the greater rulemaking benefits that those procedures entail.
CONCLUSION
The current doctrine and agency practice on administrative severability
clauses is unfortunate. Administrative severability clauses allow agencies to ex-
press their expert and popularly informed opinion on the severability of their
rules. And if courts routinely deferred to those opinions, they would promote
expertise, accountability, the rule of law, and efficiency in regulatory schemes.
However, the federal courts have implicitly analogized administrative sev-
erability clauses to severability clauses contained in statutes. Based on this
analogy, federal courts have developed a doctrine in which the severability de-
cision "will rarely turn on the presence or absence of ... a[n] [administrative
severability] clause."' As a consequence, agencies have diminished incentives
to promulgate their opinions on severability by means of notice-and-comment
procedures. And the actual frequency with which agencies include severability
clauses in their rules reflects these diminished incentives. Agencies have been
content to leave the severability decision to the courts.
Current doctrine and agency practice suggest that courts need a deference
framework for administrative severability clauses. Under this framework,
courts should police the boundaries of the agency's lawmaking authority by en-
suring that regulatory remainders are lawful. But when a regulatory remainder
is lawful, a reviewing court should follow the opinion an agency expressed in a
severability clause.
2348
2a. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F. 2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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APPENDIX: ADMINISTRATIVE SEVERABILITY CLAUSES BY AGENCY
Number of Total Percentage of
Rules with a Number of Total Rules
Agency Severability Rules (as with a
Clause of October Severability30, 2014) Clause
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 245 3 95 3.2%
Bureau of Land Management24 6  1 88 1.1%
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 1 10 248  10%
Board 47
Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion249 3 243 1.2%
Department of Health and Human Ser- 2,866 <1%
vices
2 5 °
245. (1) Mortgage Acts and Practices-Advertising (Regulation N), 12 C.F.R. § 1014.7 (2015);
Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (Regulation 0), 12 C.F.R § 1O15.11 (2015);
(2) Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 12 C.F.R. § 1024.22 (2015); Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 76 Fed. Reg. 78,978, 78,998 (Dec. 20,
2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. io24);
(3) Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation
X), 12 C.F.R. § 1024.22 (2015); Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 1O,695, 10,718 (Feb. 14, 2013) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. lo24).
246. Rights-of-Way, Principles and Procedures; Rights-of-Way Under the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act and the Mineral Leasing Act, 43 C.F.R. § 28o1.8 (2015).
247. Rules Implementing the Government in the Sunshine Act, 40 C.F.R. § 1603.14 (2014).
248. We determined this figure by searching Bloomberg Law for final rules that contain the phrase
"Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board." We then manually filtered the rules and
identified ten hits.
249. (1) Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 17 C.F.R. 5 43.1 (2014);
(2) Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors, 17 C.F.R. S 4.17 (2014);
(3) Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 17 C.F.R. § 151.13 (2014).
250. (1) Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning Services Pro-
jects, 42 C.F.R. Pt. 59 (2014);
(2) Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. pts.
16o, 164 (2014);
(3) Applications for FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing
Requirements and Application of 3o-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug
Applications Certifying that a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed,
21 C.F.R. Pt. 314 (2014).
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Department of Homeland
Security 25 1  2 7,212 <1%
Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment 2 2 1 397 <1%
Department of Justice25 3  2 607 <1%
Employment and Training Administra-
tion 25 4 1 73 1.4%
Environmental Protection Agency 25 5  8 8,070 <1%
Federal Communications Commission256 5 2,952 <1%
251. (1) Standards for Living Organisms in Ships' Ballast Waste Discharged in U.S. Waters, 33
C.F.R. pt. 151, 46 C.F.R. pt. 162 (2014).
(2) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 6 C.F.R. Pt. 27 (2014).
252. (1) Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.22 (2014).
253. (1) International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 28 C.F.R. § 94.11
(2014);
(2) Public Safety Officers' Death, Disability, and Educational Assistance Benefit Claims, 28
C.F.R. § 32.4 (2014);
(3) Public Safety Officers' Death, Disability, and Educational Assistance Benefit Claims, 28
C.F.R. 5 32.4.
254. (1) Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the Unites States; Modernizing
the Labor Certification Process and Enforcement, 20 C.F.R. pt. 65S.
2S5. (i) National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Secondary Lead
Smelting, 40 C.F.R. pt. 63 (2014);
(2) Determination of Attainment of the 1-Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Stand-
ards in the Sacramento Metro Nonattainment Area in California, 40 C.F.R. Pt. 52 (2014);
(3) Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR), 40 C.F.R. Pt. 51 (2014); Expansion of
RCRA Comparable Fuel Exclusion, 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 (2014);
(4) Administrative Stay of Clean Air Interstate Rule for Minnesota; Administrative Stay of
Federal Implementation Plan To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone for Minnesota, 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52 (2014);
(5) Consolidated Federal Air Rule (CAR): Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing In-
dustry, 40 C.F.R. pts. 6o, 61, 63, 65 (2014);
(6) Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain,
NV, 40 C.F.R. pt. 197 (2014);
(7) Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Modifications to Reformulated Gasoline Cov-
ered Area Provisions, 40 C.F.R. pt. 8o (2014).
256. (1) Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 47 C.F.R. pt. 64 (2014);
(2) Closed Captioning of Internet Protocol-Delivered Video Programming: Implementation
of the Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, 47




Federal Railroad Administration 25 7  4 176 2.3%
Federal Trade Commission258  13 206 6.3%
Forest Service 259  5 159 3.1%
(3) Implementation of the Commercial Advertisement Loudness Mitigation (CALM) Act, 47
C.F.R. pts. 73, 76 (2014);
(4) 2oo6 Quadrennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Commission's Broadcast Own-
ership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 47 C.F.R. Pt. 73 (2014);
(5) Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers,
Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, and Definitions of Radio
Markets, 47 C.F.R. Pt. 73 (2014).
257. (1) Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings, 49 C.F.R. § 222. 3 (b)
(2014);
(2) Positive Train Control Systems, 49 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2014);
(3) Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossing, 49 C.F.R. § 222.3;
(4) Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossing, 49 C.F.R. § 222.3.
258. (1) Business Opportunity Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 437.10 (2014);
(2) Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.12 (2014);
(3) Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising,16 C.F.R. § 436.11
(2014);
(4) CAN-SPAM Rule, 16 C.F.R. 5 316.6 (2014);
(5) Prohibitions of Energy Market Manipulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 317.5 (2014);
(6) Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.9 (2014);
(7) Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 16 C.F.R. Pt. 322 (2014);
(8) Mortgage Acts and Practices-Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 321.7 (2014).
(9) Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 31o.8 (2014).
(io) CAN-SPAM Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 316.6;
(11) Amendment of Rules Under the FACT Act, 16 C.F.R. § 6o4.1 (2014);
(12) Contact Lens Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 315.10 (2014);
(13) Definitions and Implementation Under the CAN-SPAM Act, 16 C.F.R. § 316.6 (2014).
259. (1) National Forest System Land Management Planning, 36 C.F.R. 5 219.18 (2015); National
Forest System Land Management Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162, 21,244, 21,270 (Apr. 9, 2012)
(codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219);
(2) National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg. 21,468, 21,502, 21,512
(Apr. 21, 2oo8) (codified at 36 C.F.R. Pt. 219);
(3) Special Areas, 36 C.F.R. § 294.18 (2015); Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66
Fed. Reg. 3,244, 3,260 (Jan. 12, 2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294);
(4) National Forest System Land Management Planning, 7o Fed. Reg. 1023, 1052, 1o6o (Jan.
5, 2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219);
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National Indian Gaming Commission 26 °
National Labor Relations Board26I


















(S) Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management, 70 Fed. Reg.
25,654, 25,655, 25,662 (May 13, 2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
a6o. Technical Standards for Electronic, Computer, or Other Technologic Aids Used in the Play
of Class II Games, 25 C.F.R. S 547.5 (2o14).
261. Representation-Case Procedures, 29 C.F.R. pts. 101, 102 (2014).
262. (1) Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions; Fisheries of
the Northeastern United States; Northeast Region Standardized Bycatch Reporting Meth-
odology Omnibus Amendment, 50 C.F.R. pt. 648 (2014).
z63. Concession Contracts, 36 C.F.R. S 51.103 (2014).
264. Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca
Mountain, NV, 1O C.F.R. 5 63.343 (2014).
265. Cranes and Derricks in Construction, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1442 (2015).
266. The Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service Bylaws of the Board of Governors, 39
C.F.R. § 2.6 (2015).
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